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Abstract
A global deluge of debit cards and prepaid cards – payment cards that do not 
require consumers to qualify for credit – is rapidly making electronic payment systems 
accessible to much of the world’s population that previously paid in cash for goods and 
services.  The global proliferation of payment cards is fraught with both risk and promise 
for consumers.  
The billions of people of low to moderate incomes who are being hurled from a 
cash economy into the era of electronic payments in emerging economies by the 
proliferation of debit and prepaid cards are particularly vulnerable to abuses by banks and 
merchants.  Unregulated private lawmaking by payment card associations and card 
issuers will not ensure that consumers are treated fairly, due to their countervailing 
incentives to attract merchants into their payment networks. Technological solutions 
promote efficiency and limit abuse, but cannot ensure fair resolution of consumer-
merchant disputes.  Payment card associations such as Visa and MasterCard operate 
chargeback systems for resolving disputes, but chargeback systems cannot function in 
cash economies without merchants’ consent, because cash transactions are usually 
anonymous, evidenced at most by a receipt, and do not involve an intermediary.  
However, while the lack of anonymity inherent in the use of payment cards entails 
risk for consumer privacy, it also makes possible greater transparency in payment 
systems.   As billions of vulnerable consumers become connected to electronic payment 
systems, chargeback systems become a possible means of protecting them from merchant 
misconduct.  Moreover, this lack of anonymity makes possible new ways of protecting 
consumers, such as disclosure to consumers of outcomes of the Visa and MasterCard 
chargeback systems through merchant ratings such as those posted on eBay.
There is a risk that nations with emerging economies will uncritically emulate 
regimes of consumer protection adopted in the United States and Europe.  These regimes
in many respects lack a consistent conceptual foundation and fail to address problems, 
such as bank fees, access to banking services and payment system insolvency, that are 
poorly addressed in developed countries if they are addressed at all.  For example, debit 
and prepaid card transactions are both a convenient means of obtaining cash and a 
substitute for cash, but this does not justify denying chargeback rights to consumers who 
use debit and prepaid cards, as if they had paid in cash.  
Prior scholarship on payment cards has suffered from the assumption that 
American use of credit cards is normative.  This article demonstrates that it is a global 
anomaly; most consumers worldwide use payment cards for convenience rather than a 
source of long-term credit, and that is why debit cards have become popular so quickly.  
Moreover, fees and charges imposed on consumers for payment card services are one of 
the most prolific sources of consumer complaints.  Fee regulation should be regarded as a 
legitimate part of payments law in scholarship on the subject, and should not be ignored 
in establishing a regulatory system to govern debit and prepaid cards.
1I. Introduction
Debit cards, sometimes issued as “ATM cards,” “check cards,” “cash cards,” and 
“Smart Cards” or “chip cards,”1 are proliferating worldwide at a staggering rate.2 Debit 
cards are distinguished from credit cards and charge cards in that the use of a debit card 
results in a direct debit to the user’s bank account, while the use of a credit card or charge 
card3 results in an extension of credit to the cardholder.  
Although the volume of credit card transactions also has grown,4 in 2003 debit 
cards overtook credit cards in aggregate dollar volume worldwide in Visa, by far the 
largest of the payment card networks representing about half of the global payment card 
market.5  Debit cards are now the dominant card-based payment system everywhere 
except the United States, Canada and Japan, and the most widely used non-cash 
consumer payment system in the world.  Even in the United States, debit card 
transactions have risen precipitously, and now represent a higher percentage of Visa 
point-of-sale (“POS”) transactions than credit cards.6
In China alone, according to the People’s Bank of China over 663 million debit 
cards, the overwhelming majority of them issued by domestic banks, were active in 
2004;7 as of 1995, the number stood at 5 million.8
Moreover, in a massive change that has accelerated during the past 3-5 years, 
instead of cash, millions of employees from Russia to Mexico are now paid through 
prepaid cards called “payroll cards,” which they can swipe at a store to make a purchase 
and have the price debited from an account funded by wages deposited by their employer.  
Prepaid cards include phone cards, gift cards, payroll cards,9 benefit cards, and 
travel cards, among others.  Prepaid cards are increasingly used to pay public benefits, 
especially in the many countries in which checks are rarely used as a method of payment.  
Prepaid cards may be prepaid debit cards, the use of which results in a debit to a bank 
account opened for the benefit of the cardholder, e.g., by an employer, or they may be 
1
 “Smart Cards,” also called “chip cards,” are multifunction cards that include a microchip.  They can 
function as debit cards or credit cards, or perform other data functions.  See Section II.B, infra.
2 See infra, Section III.  See also Ronald J. Mann, “Making Sense of Payments Policy in the Information 
Age,” 93 Geo. L.J. 633, 653 (2005) (“Mann”) (describing the rise of debit cards in the U.S. to prominence 
since the late 1990’s).  
3
 Charge cards, such as Diners Club and most American Express cards, differ from credit cards in that 
unpaid balances cannot be rolled over at the end of a billing cycle and must be paid in full each time.
4
 BIS Retail Payments Study, Charts 3-5; Table 1, infra.
5
 “[G]lobal Visa debit card volume reached US$1.48 trillion at the end of 2003, an increase of 17 percent 
over the previous year.  At the same time global Visa credit volume increased five percent from the 
previous year to US$1.45 trillion.”  Available at http://www.corporate.visa.com/md/nr/press217.jsp.  
6
 Jonathan Zinman, “Why Use Debit Instead of Credit?  Consumer Choice in a Trillion Dollar Market,” 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, July 15, 2004, at 2, available at 
www.newyorkfed.org/research/economists/zinman/2842_debit_or_credit.pdf.
7
 Financial Times Asia Intelligence Wire, February 16, 2005.  In contrast, only one million of China’s 1.3 
billion people have credit cards.  Asia Pulse, January 6, 2004, available on Westlaw Database WNS-FI.
8 See Ted Griffith, “MBNA Sets Sights on China,” (May 23, 2004), www.delawareonline.com (also 
pointing out that most people have to make bank deposits and withdrawals in person, apparently due to the 
lack of ATM’s).
9 See Budnitz, supra, at 6-7; Christoslav E. Anguelov, Marianne A. Hilgert, and Jeanne M. Hogarth, “U.S. 
Consumers and Electronic Banking, 1995-2003,” p. 5, Federal Reserve Bulletin, Winter 2004, Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors, available at www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2004/winter04_ca.pdf. 
2“stored value cards” in which value is stored on the card itself.10 While some prepaid 
cards, so-called “closed loop” cards including most gift and phone cards, are usable only 
for purchases from a particular retailer or service provider, increasingly prepaid cards are 
network-branded “open loop” cards, transactions with which are processed through the 
Visa, MasterCard, and other payment card networks.11
Because prepaid cards do not require either creditworthiness or a bank account, 
they are proliferating especially in areas such as Africa and parts of Latin America where 
relatively few people have bank accounts.12  However, even in the United States, prepaid 
phone cards have become popular and payroll cards are catching on as a way to pay 
wages to the many, usually low-income employees who lack a bank account, sometimes 
referred to as “the unbanked.”13
Several factors have contributed to the rise of the debit card and the prepaid card.  
As further discussed in this article, most developing countries never acquired the credit 
card habit; they lack the credit information and reporting systems necessary to support 
credit cards, and relatively few of their citizens have sufficient demonstrable income to 
qualify for credit.  While computer use and e-commerce are growing in the developing 
countries, they remain the domain of a small percentage of those populations.  As a 
result, as the “Plastic Revolution” takes hold in developing countries like China, Brazil 
and Mexico, it is not credit cards but debit and prepaid cards that are beginning to 
transform the cash economies in places like China, Brazil and southern Africa.
The trend toward debit and prepaid card use is part of what some economists have 
erroneously called a trend toward “cashlessness.”14  However, debit cards and many 
prepaid cards are not only a substitute for cash, but also a convenient means of obtaining 
10 See generally, Mark E. Budnitz, “Payment Systems Update 2005: Substitute Checks, Remotely Created 
Items, Payroll Cards, and Other New-Fangled Products,” 59 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 3, 6-7 (Spr.-Sum. 
2005) (“Budnitz”);  “Prepaid Cards in Europe 2004,” DataMonitor March 5, 2004, available at 
http://datamonitor.com/~ec641c4fc0a346018e7b491430411c27~/industries/research/?pid=BFFS0243&type
=Brief.; Julia S. Cheney, “Prepaid Card Models: a Study in Diversity,” Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia, March, 2005, available at http://www.paymentsnews.com/2005/03/philadelphia_fe.html; 
Mark Furletti and Stephen Smith, “The Laws, Regulations, and Industry Practices That Protect Consumers 
Who Use Electronic Payment Systems: ACH E-checks and Prepaid Cards,” Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia, March, 2005, available at http://www.paymentsnews.com/2005/03/philadelphia_fe.html; Beth 
S. DeSimone & Carrie A. O’Brien, “Payroll Cards: Would you like your pay with those fries?” 9 N.C. 
Banking Inst. 35 (2005). 
11
 Prepaid cards may also be divided into “online” and “offline” cards.  The latter are stored value cards 
such as copy cards used in copy machines which carry value stored internally on the card.  The former are 
cards that electronically access value stored in an account maintained on a database at a bank, payroll 
processor, retailer, or other external location.  In the U.S., stored value cards are not currently covered by 
Federal Reserve Regulation E.  The Federal Reserve has proposed to extend Regulation E coverage to 
payroll cards, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has proposed extending deposit insurance to 
cover funds accessed with certain payroll cards.  See Budnitz, supra, at 6.
12 See infra, Sections III.C, D and E.
13
 Budnitz, supra, at 6-7; “Card Usage Climbs: New survey shows prepaid card usage doubled in the last 
two years,” InteleCard News, 1/1/02, available at 
http://www.intelecard.com/factsandfigures/03factsandfig.asp?A_ID=97. 
14 See Sheri M. Markose and Yiing Jia Loke, “Can Cash Hold Its Own?  International Comparisons: Theory 
and Evidence” (February 2002) (unpublished manuscript); Sheri M. Markose and Yiing Jia Loke, 
“Changing trends in payment systems for selected G10 and EU countries 1990-1998,” International 
Correspondent Banking Review Yearbook 2000/2001, April 2001.  The foregoing articles are available at 
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scher/.  
3it at an automated teller machine (ATM), and ATM’s, already ubiquitous in the 
developed countries, are rapidly spreading through the developing world.  Cash payments 
still amount to an estimated 70-90% of retail payment volume15 though they are low in 
value compared to card transactions.  In recent years the growth in volume of debit card 
transactions has outpaced that of credit cards, indicating that payment cards – even credit 
cards - are primarily used as a cheap means of funds transfer rather than for credit 
purposes.16 Rather than curtail the use of cash, the spread of debit cards has revitalized 
cash economies by making cash more readily available.17
Debit cards and “open loop” prepaid cards can be used either at ATM’s or at the 
point of sale (POS).18 Other ways by which consumers access and transfer funds 
electronically include automated clearing house (“ACH”) payments; home banking; 
electronic giros (“e-giro”) in Europe and parts of Asia; and Internet-based “electronic 
cash.”  However, none of these other methods has approached debit cards in the number 
or volume of transactions, nor in worldwide growth.19
Credit card use is not growing nearly as rapidly as debit card use.20 Globally, the 
ability to finance a purchase and carry a balance on a credit card seems to hold limited 
appeal, because most consumers use payment cards – even credit cards - for convenience, 
as a cash substitute or a way to obtain cash, not as a loan.  Available data show that card 
use in retail payments has grown primarily at the expense of cash.21 This is even true in 
the United States, where of the personal consumption on goods and services in 1996, 
57% were made by checks, 21% with cash and 22% with payment cards.   In contrast, in 
1984, only 6% of personal consumption spending in the United States was made with 
cards, compared with 58% with checks and 36% with cash.22 While American 
consumers persist in the habit of maintaining large credit card balances and resist the use 
of debit cards for purchases, they remain an anomaly compared to consumers in most 
other countries.23
The stakes involved in the proliferation of debit and prepaid cards may be much 
15
 Markose and Loke, “Can Cash Hold Its Own?  International Comparisons: Theory and Evidence,” supra, 
at 4 (“despite the significant trend towards non-cash retail payments, it is estimated that 70%-90% of the 
volume of retail transactions remain cash financed”).  However, Mann cites data from a November 2003 
Nilson report indicating that in the U.S. as of 2002 only 42% of retail payment transactions were cash-
financed.
16 Ibid.; see also Mann, supra, at 656-658.
17
 Bank for International Settlements, Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, “Retail Payments in 
Selected Countries: a Comparative Study,” September, 1999 (“BIS Retail Payments Study”), at 12.
18
 For a description of various uses of payment cards by consumers and the structure of payment card 
networks with diagrams, see Benjamin Geva, The Law of Electronic Funds Transfers (Newark: Matthew 
Bender & Co., 2003), ¶6.02.
19 See BIS Retail Payments Study, supra, at 14 and Charts 3-5.
20 See Table 1, infra.
21 See Sheri M. Markose and Yiing Jia Loke, “Can Cash Hold Its Own?  International Comparisons: Theory 
and Evidence” (February 2002) (unpublished manuscript); Sheri M. Markose and Yiing Jia Loke, 
“Changing trends in payment systems for selected G10 and EU countries 1990-1998,” International 
Correspondent Banking Review Yearbook 2000/2001, April 2001.  These articles are available at 
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scher/
22
 David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Paying with Plastic: the Digital Revolution in Buying and 
Borrowing (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000) (1st ed.), at 91. See also Mann, supra, at 656.
23 See BIS Retail Payments Study, supra, Chart 9, and Ronald Mann, “Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the 
United States and Japan,” 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1055 (May 2002).  Also, see infra, Section IV.A.
4greater than the fees generated by payment card transactions.  While the deluge of debit 
and prepaid cards in emerging economies is linking much of the world’s population, and 
many of its retail businesses, to payment card networks for the first time, mobile 
telephones are linking many of the same people to the telecommunications network.24
Mobile banking,25 in particular, promises to draw many of the as-yet-unbanked into the 
payments marketplace.26 Two recent studies suggest that these related phenomena each 
will generate an economic “growth dividend” in the developing world.27 Mobile 
telephone service providers may also emerge as serious competition for banks and money 
remitters, based on prepaid phone cards. Moreover, technology is emerging in the 
economically developed world for the use of mobile phones to make payments at 
checkout counters; mobile payments may become a common method to circumvent the 
cash register.
This article will explore the implications for consumer protection policy of the 
global proliferation of debit and prepaid cards and the regional differences in payment 
habits that affect the pace and distribution of that proliferation. Despite the explosive 
growth in debit and prepaid cards, and to a lesser extent, in credit cards, few countries 
outside North America and the E.U. have enacted consumer protection laws regulating 
the rights of card users with respect to card issuers or merchants.28 Within North 
America and the E.U., issues such as the reversibility of consumer transactions and the 
allocation of losses caused by unauthorized transactions are resolved in ways that are 
inconsistent and analytically unsatisfactory, and unduly influenced by legal regimes 
24 Mobile phone penetration of the consumer market already surpasses, in most countries, the percentage of 
consumers who have checking accounts.  In Africa, 6.1% of the population had a mobile phone as of the 
end of 2003, and they are often shared – a study in Tanzania revealed that as much as 28% of the 
population had “access” to a mobile phone - while consumer checking accounts are rare in many African 
countries.  Mobile phone service in Africa is overwhelmingly paid for with prepaid cards.  In Europe 
overall, 55% of the population had a mobile phone, while the highest incidence of checking accounts in 
Europe was about 40 percent in France.  In Asia, 15% of the population had a mobile phone, and in most 
Asian countries checking accounts are not typically used by consumers.
25 See, e.g., “China’s Exploding Wireless Industry,” mPulse Magazine (Hewlett Packard, Inc.), October 
2001, www.cooltown.com/cooltown/mpulse/1001-china.asp (wireless stock trading from mobile phones 
already common among 70 million Chinese who buy and sell stocks in China); “Calling Across the 
Divide,” The Economist, March 12, 2005, at 74 (vendors in marketplace stalls in Zambia pay for inventory 
using text messages on mobile phones).
26
 Harry Leinonen, “Developments in Retail Payment Systems,” Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”) 
Papers, No. 7 (Nov. 2001), at 63, Box 1.
27 See “Electronic Payments Worth R7bn – Visa,” http://business.iafrica.com/news/389484.htm
(November 10, 2004) (studies conducted by Global Insight and Econometrix indicating that a ten percent 
increase in electronic payments as a share of private consumption expenditure would translate into an 
increase of 0.6 percent in GDP); Leonard Waverman, Meloria Meschi and Melvyn Fuss, “The Impact of 
Telecoms on Economic Growth in Developing Countries” (“Waverman”), in Africa: The Impact of Mobile 
Phones (Vodafone Policy Paper Series, No. 2, March 2005),  at 10-11, available at 
www.vodafone.com/africa (study by scholars from London Business School, John Cabot University 
(Rome), and University of Toronto, together with LECG Consultants, suggesting that an increase of ten 
mobile phones per 100 people in a typical developing country expands GDP by 0.6 percent) See also 
“Calling Across the Divide,” The Economist, March 12, 2005, at 74.
28
 For a summary of existing laws, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”), Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, Committee on Consumer Policy, “Report on 
Consumer Protections for Payment Cardholders,” June 14, 2002 (“OECD Report on Consumer Protections 
for Payment Cardholders”).
5designed to regulate the use of different payment technologies twenty or thirty years 
ago.29
While often cognizant of the inconsistencies in American payments law, 
scholarship in payment systems frequently has been premised on the assumption that 
American payments culture, and the American addiction to credit cards, is normative.  
With over one billion consumers in Asia, Latin America, Africa and the former Soviet 
bloc countries gaining access to electronic payment networks with debit and prepaid 
cards, and few of them owning or using credit cards, this assumption is no longer 
accurate, if it ever was.  
At the same time, the resolution of issues of consumer protection policy in those 
areas has become critical. Without legislation to regulate payment cards in developing 
countries, the governments of those countries effectively cede consumer protection to 
private lawmaking by card associations and banks. Part V of this article will discuss the 
inadequacies of private lawmaking to protect debit and prepaid card users, the problems 
of consumer protection that must be resolved in regulatory policy, and the lack of 
satisfactory American solutions to solve the global problems of protecting consumers 
newly introduced to electronic means of payment by the proliferation of debit and 
prepaid cards.
II. Debit and Prepaid Card Transactions
A. Transaction Structure
Debit card transactions may be processed through payment card networks such as 
Visa and MasterCard, or they may be processed through interbank networks such as the 
Star and Cirrus systems. The key parties to a debit card transaction are the cardholder
(usually a consumer),30 the merchant, the card issuer (a bank where the cardholder 
maintains an account or has deposited funds), the “merchant acquirer” (the merchant’s 
bank), the processor (in most cases) that processes the transaction for the merchant 
acquirer, the payment card association (e.g., Visa and MasterCard) or interbank network 
(e.g., Star and Cirrus in the United States) that provides facilities for clearing and settling 
the transaction between banks.  Debit card transactions resemble credit card transactions 
in most respects, the major differences being the debit posted directly to the cardholder’s 
bank account and the fee structure.  
Debit card transactions are governed by a series of contracts.  The underlying 
contract between merchant and consumer gives rise to the payment obligation and 
authorizes the merchant to draw funds from the consumer’s bank account to satisfy it.  
The consumer-card issuer contract governs the obligation of the bank to honor an 
authorized order to pay funds from the consumer’s account.  The merchant-merchant 
acquirer contract governs the rights of the merchant to be credited with funds by the 
merchant acquirer once the merchant presents the transaction to the merchant acquirer , 
and the right of the merchant acquirer to deduct a fee, called a “discount.”    The 
merchant transfers its rights against the consumer to the merchant acquirer , which then 
29 See generally Mann, supra.
30 See text at note 15, infra.  Many countries do not draw a distinction between consumer and non-
consumer debit cardholders.  The United States and certain EU countries do.
6transfers these rights to the card issuer in exchange for payment in accordance with 
payment card association rules that contractually bind both banks as association 
members.  The card issuer then debits the consumer’s account for the authorized amount
in accordance with the payment order and its contract with the consumer.
The costs of processing payment card transactions generally are borne by 
merchants through discount fees paid per transaction to their merchant acquirers.  The 
merchant acquirers are the merchant’s banks, members of Visa, MasterCard or another 
card association, which either own – as in the case of Chase - or are part of a bank 
association affiliated with, a processing entity, the largest of which in the U.S. is First 
Data Corporation.  These banks are called “merchant acquirers” because by contracting 
with the merchant to accept payment through Visa or MasterCard they are said to have 
“acquired” the merchant for the Visa or MasterCard association.31
Visa, the largest payment card network, is an association of banks governed by a 
common set of bylaws and operating regulations.  It is organized as the Visa International 
association, comprised of six regional entities, the largest of which is Visa USA, Inc.32
Each regional entity is owned by member banks in the region.  Worldwide, Visa has 
about 21,000 member banks.  Banks may join as card issuers, merchant acquirers or both; 
however, the merchant acquirer business as a practical matter is concentrated in a few 
large banks33 while many smaller banks join so they can issue payment cards with the 
Visa logo.  The regional entities provide member banks with clearing and settlement 
facilities for payment card transactions within their region, and also with security 
technology and procedures.  The MasterCard association has a structure similar to Visa’s.
B. Types of Debit and Prepaid Cards
Debit cards are categorized as PIN (“personal identification number”) debit , also 
called “online” debit, and signature debit, also called “offline.”34  Signature debit cards 
are mainly issued in the United States by Visa and MasterCard member banks, bear the 
Visa or MasterCard logo, and do not exist in most other countries, such as Canada where 
all debit cards are PIN-based.  A signature is required, as with a credit card.  PIN debit 
card transactions require entry of a PIN into a keypad, and normally clear through 
interbank networks such as the Star and Cirrus systems.
Although most consumers do not know it, there are significant differences 
between the two.  PIN debit card transactions clear and are debited to the consumer’s 
bank account almost instantaneously; they are real-time transactions.  In the U.S., the 
consumer often will be charged a fee by her bank for using another bank’s or a 
merchant’s facilities to consummate the PIN debit transaction.  Such fees are uncommon
in many other countries.
31 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., 396 F.3d 96, 101-102 (2nd Cir. 2005).
32
 Other regional organizations include Visa Latin America, Visa Asia Pacific, Visa Europe, and a region 
encompassing Africa and the Middle East.
33
 In the U.S., a group of large banks affiliated with First Data Corp., the largest processor, has almost half 
of the merchant acquirer market, while Chase, which has its own processor called Chase Merchant 
Services, has about 13% of the market.  
34
 “Offline” is really a misnomer.  Stored value cards and cash are true “offline” payment devices.  
Signature debit transactions may be posted and cleared electronically, but they are not posted and cleared in 
real time like PIN debit transactions.
7Signature debit transactions, like most checks, take two to three days to clear and 
be posted to the consumer’s bank account.  They are riskier for the merchant, which 
could go unpaid if during those two to three days the consumer closes or depletes his 
bank account.  However, signature debit is favored by American banks, which receive 
higher fees from merchants, paid in the form of discounts from what is credited to the 
merchant’s account, than they do in PIN debit transactions.  In contrast, merchants 
benefit from PIN debit in the form of lower discounts, but American consumers have 
resisted PIN debit due to the fees passed on to them by merchants and banks.
Many newer debit cards are actually “Smart cards.”  Rather than a magnetic strip, 
Smart cards contain a microchip.  This makes them capable of storing a greater volume of 
data and performing multiple functions.  Smart cards can have both debit and credit 
functions, of which the consumer can choose either at the point of sale.  They can collect, 
utilize and send data about purchases, benefit entitlements, and other information.
For the card issuer, Smart Cards represent an additional source of information 
about the consumer, and a possible source of additional revenue through the use or sale of 
that information.  For the consumer, there is a risk of loss of privacy in the collection of 
this information. This capacity is not new; the ability to collect information about the 
consumer proved to be a selling point when Visa and MasterCard were building their 
bank networks in the United States in the 1970’s.  The inability to share customer 
information with other banks was one reason that in the late 1960’s Bank of America 
ceded control of its BankAmericard franchise network, the predecessor of Visa, to what 
became the Visa International association.35
As discussed above, prepaid cards are categorized as “open loop” and “closed 
loop” cards, depending on whether they are usable only at a certain merchant.   At one 
time “closed loop” credit and charge cards issued by department stores and oil companies 
were common in the U.S, and they are still issued in some emerging economies.36
C. Fee Structure and the Wal-Mart Settlement
The following is a description of the fee arrangements in a typical credit card 
transaction, which differ only in limited respects from those of a debit card transaction:
Bank A issues a Visa credit card to Consumer X, who purchases a garment 
for $ 100 at Store Y, which was "acquired" for Visa by Bank B. Visa rules 
mandate that Bank B must pay Bank A an interchange fee of 1.25% of the 
amount of the transaction, i.e., $ 1.25. Bank B will charge Store Y a 
"discount fee" higher than $ 1.25 in order to recover the mandated 
interchange fee and other fees that Visa rules mandate Bank B to pay Visa 
on each and every Visa credit card (and debit card) transaction and to earn 
a profit for itself. Thus, Bank B may charge a discount fee of 1.60% of the 
transaction amount (or $ 1.60) to Store Y. When Store Y presents 
35 See David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Paying with Plastic: the Digital Revolution in Buying and 
Borrowing (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005) (2nd ed.) (“Evans and Schmalensee”), at 72-73.  Page references 
below to Evans and Schmalensee are to the 2nd edition.
36
 So-called “private label” credit cards in the United States today normally bear the logo of a merchant but 
also a Visa or MasterCard logo; because of the Visa or MasterCard affiliation they can be used at other 
merchants’ locations.  
8Consumer X's $ 100 Visa transaction to Bank B, the bank will credit Store 
Y's account for $ 98.40, send the Visa mandated $ 1.25 interchange fee to 
Bank A and retain the $ .35 balance of the "discount fee."37
Other than the fact that Consumer X’s bank account at Bank A will be debited
rather than having credit extended, there is little difference between the described credit 
card transaction and a debit card transaction except the revenue structure for the issuing 
bank.  When a consumer pays by debit card, there is no revolving credit extended and no 
possibility of interest income for the card issuer as in a credit card transaction, so the 
issuer’s principal revenue source is the interchange fee.  
However, interchange fees on PIN debit transactions in the United States have 
been limited, for historical reasons.  Debit cards were introduced in the U.S. in the 1970’s 
as “ATM cards,” used only for withdrawing cash from automatic teller machines.  When 
in 1986, some banks belonging to interbank networks began to transform ATM cards into 
online PIN debit cards by persuading merchants, particularly gas stations and 
convenience stores, to install equipment to accept them,38 consumers resisted having to 
pay a fee for online debit card transactions to use their own money.  Merchants, too, 
objected to being charged interchange fees for point of sale (“POS”) debit card 
transactions when no such fees were paid on ATM card transactions, and many 
merchants instituted per-transaction fees.39  Consequently, low bank fees became the rule 
for PIN debit.
As a result of the low interchange fee structure for PIN debit compared to credit 
cards, prior to about 1990, banks in the U.S. displayed little interest in issuing debit cards 
except as a convenience to their customers for use at ATM’s.  Due to the fees they were 
charged for using a debit card other than at their own bank’s ATM, relatively few 
consumers used them to make purchases and few merchants installed equipment to accept 
them.40  Online debit cards did not become widespread in North America until the 
1990’s.41
About 1990, Visa embarked on a campaign to promote the use of debit cards.  To 
overcome the problem that interchange fees on online debit cards were too low to entice 
its member banks to issue more debit cards, Visa created a different form of debit card, 
the “offline” or signature debit card, which would work like Visa credit cards and involve 
an interchange fee set only slightly lower than the interchange fee issuers would receive 
on credit cards.42  The new signature Visa debit cards would be a better deal for issuers, 
that would rake in more interchange fees than on online debit cards; the same or a better 
deal for consumers, who in some cases still would have to pay transaction fees, but in 
some cases would not; and a worse deal for merchants, that would see more of their 
37 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., supra, 396 F.3d at 102.
38
 The first use of ATM cards at the point of sale in North America appears to have been in Saskatchewan, 
Canada in 1981, as an experiment operated by a group of credit unions.
39
 Richard Mitchell, “Bridging the Debit Gap; Signature and PIN point-of-sale debit once were separate 
worlds, but now there are signs of convergence.  Will one form of debit gain primacy in the U.S.?”  Credit 
Card Management, Vol. 17, No. 11, at 30 (February, 2005).
40
 Evans and Schmalensee, supra, at 80.  Interbank networks independent of Visa and MasterCard started 
trying to market debit card use at the point of sale with PIN numbers (“online debit”) in 1986.
41
 Evans and Schmalensee, supra, at 81.
42 Ibid.
9receipts disappear in the form of fees and chargebacks.  MasterCard followed suit with a 
similar signature-based debit card strategy.43
This division of the debit card market was unique to the United States.  In no 
other country are signature-based debit cards regularly issued by financial institutions.44
In Canada, there is only one form of debit card transaction: online debit cards; and there 
is only one debit card network.  There have never been interchange fees; the Canadian 
debit card network is run at par, like the American check collection system.45  However, 
Canadian consumers even today pay higher transaction fees for the use of debit cards 
than Americans; banks charge the consumer instead of the merchant.46
The only flaw in the Visa and MasterCard strategy was the reluctance of 
merchants to accept signature-based cards when they could require consumers to use 
online debit cards and thereby lose less money in fees.  However, to overcome this 
problem, Visa and MasterCard relied on a clause in the standard merchant-merchant 
acquirer contract called the “Honor All Cards” (“HAC”) Clause, which required 
merchants to accept any card with the Visa or MasterCard logo.  In effect, they said to 
merchants that if they wanted to accept credit cards, they had to accept signature debit 
cards.
The HAC Clause was the subject of a class action antitrust lawsuit, Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A.,47 in which a class of over five million merchants represented 
by Wal-Mart, The Limited, Sears and several other large retailers as named plaintiffs 
sued Visa, MasterCard and other associations, challenging the HAC Clause as an illegal 
“tying” arrangement in violation of the Sherman Act.  The retailers alleged that they 
wanted to accept Visa and MasterCard credit cards and online debits but not the offline 
signature debit cards.  After almost nine years of litigation, a three billion dollar 
settlement of the lawsuit was approved in January 2005, the largest ever in an antitrust 
case.48
43 Ibid.
44
 Mitchell, supra n. 49.
45
 Gordon Schnell and Jeffrey Shinder, “The Great Canadian Debit Debate,” Credit Card Management, 
Vol. 17, No. 2, at 12 (May, 2004).  The authors of this article were counsel for the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart, 
supra.
46
 Oddly, however, Canadians are “swipe crazy”; they use their debit cards more frequently than anywhere 
else in the world despite the higher fees.  See “Canadians dishing out $21,50 a month on bank fees: `Swipe 
crazy’ use of debit cards inflates figure,” 1/8/05 Calgary Herald (Can.) at E4, Westlaw 2005 WLNR 
297712.  “Debit card volume in Canada matches U.S. volume despite the staggering difference in 
population.”   12/1/04 Bank Tech. News, Vol. 17, Issue 12, at 24, Westlaw 2004 WLNR 13805376.  One 
explanation is heavy marketing using travel miles and similar offers.  1/8/05 Calgary Herald, op.cit.  
Another possible explanation is that online debit cards got their start in Canada a few years earlier than in 
the U.S., around 1981, and may have been more heavily marketed there in the 1980’s, when Canadian 
consumers, like Americans, were forming their payment habits.  This heavy use has a heavy price, in that 
Canada is also distinguished by markedly higher debit card fraud losses than the U.S.  A likely contributing 
factor is that Canadian debit cards are all linked to the same online network, the Interac Association, unlike 
the U.S. which has 25 electronic funds transfer networks; Canadian fraudsters therefore have an easier task 
obtaining data and accessing accounts.  “Canada Appears to Have High PIN-Debit Losses,” Westlaw 
2/3/05 ATM & Debit News 1, vol. 6, Issue 4, 2005 WLNR 1709490.
47 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., supra at n. 47, approval of settlement aff’d, 396 F.3d 96, 102 (2nd
Cir. 2005).
48 The settlement reportedly came close to driving Visa U.S.A. into bankruptcy; allegedly it had to be 
rescued by JPMorgan.  “JPMorgan to continue issuing both Visa and MasterCard,” Cards International, 
March 9, 2005, at 8.
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 As a result of the Wal-Mart settlement, the debit card industry in the U.S. is 
undergoing a reorganization in which control of the industry’s future is in the balance.  
Along with it, the charge card industry, led by American Express,49 is going through 
major changes as well.  MBNA, the largest U.S. card issuer, is now issuing American 
Express cards, and Citibank plans to do the same.50  Meanwhile, Wal-Mart, free of the 
“HAC” Clause since the District Court initially approved the settlement in 2003, 
negotiated a temporary 30% drop in the interchange fee as part of the settlement, then 
temporarily stopped accepting MasterCard signature debit cards to keep fees down.  
Debit card interchange fees have been in flux since that time .51
Meanwhile, merchants, banks and card networks jockey for leverage.  Wal-Mart 
teamed with GE Consumer Finance and Discover to issue its own “private label” debit 
card, and is issuing prepaid debit and credit cards that can be used by people without a 
bank account.52  Discover purchased Pulse, one of the largest online debit card 
networks.53  Other retailers, such as Publix Super Markets of Florida, are offering free 
use of their proprietary ATM’s only to the customers of banks that waive interchange 
fees.54  The outcome remains uncertain, as is the effect on consumers.  Efforts by 
consumers to piggyback on Wal-Mart by filing consumer class actions against Visa, 
MasterCard and others have been unsuccessful due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding 
in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois55 denying standing to indirect purchasers, such as 
consumers, to bring actions under the antitrust laws on the theory that inflated costs were 
passed through to them.
D. Chargeback Rules
Major payment card networks, such as Visa and MasterCard, operate chargeback 
systems by which transactions can be reversed and the price charged back to the seller 
through the network, and credited to the consumer’s account.  The chargeback systems 
are governed by network association rules that are contractually binding on both card 
issuers and merchant acquirers, such as the Visa Operating Regulations.56 Chargeback 
rules differ by region.
Typically, chargeback rules provide that if a dispute is of a type that is subject to 
chargeback, once the consumer has made a good faith attempt to resolve the dispute  with 
49
 Charge cards differ from credit cards in that, at least nominally, the entire balance is due each month, 
while credit cardholders have the right to revolving credit.  Charge cards have never been as popular as 
credit cards, in part due to the decision by American Express, the primary issuer of charge cards, in the 
1950’s and 1960’s to resist the trend toward credit cards and to remain a luxury brand with more stringent 
credit requirements and lower volume.
50 Credit Card Management, Vol. 18, No. 1, at 4 (April 2005).
51
 Lavonne Kuykendall, “Overview: Unexpected Outcomes,” American Banker, Vol. 170, No. 55, at 3A 
(March 22, 2005).
52 Ibid.  About nine percent of the U.S. population is “unbanked.”  
53
 Eric Dash, “Doubts center on Discover’s growth potential,” International Herald Tribune, April 6, 2005, 
at 13.
54
 Kuykendall, supra, n. 61.
55 431 U.S. 720; 97 S. Ct. 2061; 52 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1977).
56
 For a description of how card networks operate, see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., 396 F.3d 96, 
101-102 (2nd Cir. 2005).  On the chargeback system, see OECD, “Consumer Redress in the Global 
Marketplace: Chargebacks,” September, 1996 (“OECD Chargebacks Study”).
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the merchant, the card issuer must investigate.  If it determines the consumer’s complaint 
is justified, the charge to the consumer’s account must be reversed by the card issuer.  
Under association rules, binding between banks under contract law, the issuer then may 
pass on the resulting claim for a refund to the merchant acquirer.  The merchant acquirer 
then is entitled to debit the merchant’s account to satisfy that claim.57
Chargeback may provide the consumer with recourse for certain common 
problems.  “I cancelled the transaction but didn’t get credit on my statement”; “I lost my 
card [or it was stolen] and someone used it to buy something”; “someone stole my 
information and card number and used it to buy merchandise on my account or to 
withdraw money from my bank account” (a/k/a “identity theft”); “I never received the 
goods”; and “the amount on my statement is wrong” are all common complaints that can 
be grounds for a chargeback.   Grounds for chargebacks are assigned separate 
“chargeback reason codes”; Visa U.S.A. currently recognizes 24 reason codes, while 
MasterCard has 18 and Discover has 14.58
However, the chargeback system is operated by Visa, MasterCard and other 
associations to resolve disputes between banks and between banks and merchants, not 
between consumers and merchants. Consumer protection laws generally regulate the 
consumer-card issuer relationship and the consumer-merchant relationship, but not the 
multilateral relationship among consumers, banks and merchants that characterizes the 
credit and debit card systems.  The issuer’s right to pass on the claim to the merchant 
acquirer is a contractual right of the issuer, not a right of the consumer.  Issuers have little 
incentive to pursue chargeback except to the extent they are compelled by law or contract 
to recredit the consumer’s account.  
Laws enacted in the United States, UK and several EU countries that preserve 
against the card issuer claims and defenses the consumer may possess against the 
merchant have acted as a spur to card associations and issuers to adopt chargeback rules.  
In the United States, §170 of the Truth-in-Lending Act (“TILA”)59 permits credit 
cardholders to raise against the issuer any claims or defenses they may have against the 
merchant, on certain conditions: (1) the cardholder made a “good faith attempt” to 
resolve the dispute with the merchant; (2) the transaction exceeded $50; (3) the initial 
transaction occurred in the same state or within 100 miles of the cardholder’s billing 
address; and (4) claims or defenses are limited to the balance remaining on the card when 
the cardholder first notifies the card issuer or merchant of the claim or defense.
However, laws on reversibility, with the exception of Denmark’s and Israel’s,60
57
 OECD Chargeback Study, supra, at 49-54.  The OECD Chargeback Study gives country-by- country 
descriptions of chargeback regimes for 21 countries and the EU as of 1996.  The countries covered are 
Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, and the United States.  It 
should be noted, however, that in most non-OECD countries chargeback rights may be limited to billing 
errors and may not encompass unauthorized transactions or product-related disputes.
58 See Visa Rules for Merchants, Section 7; “Chargebacks and Dispute Resolution: Reengineering 
Disputes,” available at 
http://usa.visa.com/business/accepting_visa/ops_risk_management/chargebacks_dispute_resolution/reengin
eering_disputes.html; http://www.wellsfargosecure.com/customer/chargebacks/3.htm; 
59
 15 U.S.C. §1666i.  The Truth-in-Lending Act is officially named the “Consumer Credit Protection Act.”
60
 Israeli law goes farther than Denmark’s in preserving consumer defenses against issuers of both credit 
and debit cards in case of defective and non-conforming goods and services.  Compare Debit Cards Law, 
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contain different protections for credit and debit card holders.  In the United States and 
UK, for example, only consumers who pay by credit card and not those who pay by debit 
card retain against the card issuer product related claims and defenses such as breach of 
warranty and failure of the goods or services to conform to the contract between the 
consumer and the merchant or to reasonable standards.61   In Denmark protections are the 
same for different types of cards, but do not include preservation of defenses against the 
card issuer in case of defective and non-conforming goods and services.62  Without the 
impetus of a law entitling the consumer to withhold payment from the card issuer in such 
cases, card issuers have little incentive to initiate chargeback procedures based on these 
types of claims and defenses, and consumers therefore have no effective remedy against 
merchants in many cases due to the high transaction costs of pursuing them.
Moreover, chargeback procedures were not designed as an optimal solution for 
the resolution of disputes between consumers and merchants, but to resolve disputes 
between issuer banks that issue payment cards and merchant acquirer banks that 
“acquire” merchants for the payment system and handle their accounts.  Consumers lack 
standing to pursue remedies through the chargeback process.  Because chargeback 
systems are matters of private law between banks, there are at least four features of an 
adequate consumer-merchant dispute resolution system that they lack: (a) 
comprehensiveness; (b) transparency; (c) access to information; and (d) competence.  
The OECD conducted a major study of chargebacks in 1996.63  Its conclusion was 
that “[p]ayment card companies, as financial intermediaries, may be in the best position 
to address consumer concerns by performing a broad spectrum of `chargeback’ redress 
functions, as they do for example in the United States.”64  The OECD’s Report on 
Consumer Protections for Payment Cardholders, issued in 2002, echoed this view.65  A 
number of academic studies have also advocated expansion of chargeback procedures as 
a means of dispute resolution in cyberspace.66  These studies have been primarily 
concerned with the use of chargeback procedures to resolve cross-border disputes arising 
out of electronic commerce.
Certain countries require card associations to enforce a chargeback regime for 
domestic transactions, and some card associations have voluntarily extended their 
domestic regime to cover international transactions.67   These regimes generally cover 
unauthorized transactions and billing errors, and some also cover product- and service-
related disputes.  They vary in the extent to which consumer fault affects the consumer’s 
5746-1986 (Israel), §§5 and 9, with the Act on Certain Payment Instruments, Act No. 414 of May 31, 2000 
(Denmark), §11.
61 Ibid.; U.K. Consumer Credit Act, §84, 1974, c. 39.
62 See Benjamin Geva, “Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers,” 38 C.B.L.J. 
(Canadian Business Law Journal) 207, 252 (2003).  
63
 OECD Chargebacks Study, supra.
64
 OECD Chargebacks Study, supra, at 47.
65
 Concerns about theft of card numbers “suggest that…chargebacks…have an important role to play in 
developing the business-to-consumer electronic marketplace.”  OECD Report on Consumer Protections for 
Payment Cardholders, at 4.
66 See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., “Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of ADR,” 15 
Ohio St. J. on Disp. Res. 675, 689-694 (2000); John Rothchild, “Protecting the Digital Consumer: the 
Limits of Cyberspace Utopianism,” 74 Ind. L. J. 893, 977 (1999).
67
 John Rothchild, “Protecting the Digital Consumer: the Limits of Cyberspace Utopianism,” 74 Ind. L. J. 
893, 977 (1999).
13
right to reverse the transaction.
The consumer is entitled to reversal of unauthorized transactions in several 
countries, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Korea, 
Mexico, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the United States.68  However, several countries, 
including Belgium, Denmark, Korea, Norway and Sweden, follow a fault standard which 
allows liability to shift back to the consumer in certain cases.69
Fault standards are of two types.  One standard shifts liability back to the 
consumer if the consumer was at fault in enabling the defrauder to use the card, e.g., by 
negligently losing the card or giving it to a third party.  Such standards may include 
varying degrees of shifting depending on the degree of fault; for example, in Belgium, 
there are different ceilings of liability for consumer negligence and for “extreme” 
negligence.70  They also may require more than mere negligence, as in Korea where a 
“serious mistake” is required, and in the UK where “gross negligence” will shift liability 
back to the consumer.
The other type of fault that can shift liability back to the consumer is delay in 
notifying the issuer of loss or theft of the card or other circumstances that give rise to a 
risk of misuse.  Standards in some countries are more specific than others; they may state 
a particular number of days from notice of the loss or theft, they may give a reasonable 
time; or they apply only upon receipt of a bank statement reflecting unauthorized 
transactions, shifting liability prospectively for any further unauthorized transactions. 
The latter is a type of “bank statement” rule, similar to rules in the United States
according to which delay in reporting errors or unauthorized transactions after receipt of 
a checking account or credit card statement reflecting the error or unauthorized 
transaction can estop the consumer from obtaining a recredit to his or her account.71
Billing errors, such as duplicate charges, are another type of chargeback.  In 
general, chargeback regimes require correction of billing errors.  Some, as in the United 
States, require that the consumer’s account be recredited while the error is being 
investigated, unless the investigation is concluded within a fixed, and brief, time frame.72
The other principal type of consumer dispute covered by some chargeback 
regimes is product- and service-related disputes, such as non-delivery or non-
performance by the merchant and delivery of goods in defective condition or in non-
conformity with the consumer’s contract with the merchant.  
Non-delivery tends to be covered by chargeback regimes, but issuers are less 
enthusiastic about intervening in disputes over product quality and conformity with the 
underlying contract, and this is reflected in consumer protection laws.  In the United 
States,73 the U.K., Austria, Canada, Finland, and Greece74 who pay by credit card have 
the right of chargeback against the issuer when goods arrive in defective or non-
conforming condition, or when they have any other claims or defenses against the 
68
 OECD Report on Consumer Protections for Payment Cardholders, at 14.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71
 UCC §4-406 (giving account holder 90 days after receipt of bank statement to dispute items reflected on 
it); TILA §161, 15 U.S.C. §1666 (giving credit cardholder 60 days after receipt of credit card statement to 
report “billing errors”).
72 See TILA §161, 15 U.S.C. §1666.
73
 TILA §170, 15 U.S.C. §1666i.
74 See OECD Report on Consumer Protections for Payment Cardholders, supra, at 14-15.
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merchant that would give them the legal right not to make the payment.  Debit card 
holders, however, do not have these rights.75  Among OECD member countries, only 
Denmark’s laws provide debit and credit cardholders equal chargeback rights, and 
Denmark does not provide for chargeback in product- and service-related disputes.76
III. Debit and Prepaid Cards in Emerging Economies
A. China: Explosive Growth in Debit Cards as Government Policy
The People’s Republic of China, apart from Hong Kong, was almost exclusively a 
cash economy until very recently, but much has changed.  A study published by China 
UnionPay (“CUP”) in December 2004 revealed that as of June 2004, 685 million debit 
cards had been issued in China,77 compared with about 300,000 as of 1990 and about 
eight million as of 1995.78  The number of debit cards grew 64% in 2002 alone, and rose 
from 544 million to 663 million during 2003.79 In comparison, according to the study, 
there were 29 million other bank cards in circulation.80
The proliferation of debit cards is the result of a central bank policy called the 
“Golden Cards Project,” started in 1993.81 Its purpose was to prepare the country's 
infrastructure for a national electronic payments system that would move payments in 
China from cash to chip (“Smart”) cards.82 To build this infrastructure it was necessary 
to establish a national switching system, with sixteen regional centers, to combine the 
several incompatible card payments systems already established by Chinese banks.83
Before the switching system, payment cards were difficult to use due to incompatibility 
among the systems used by Chinese banks.84
The concentration on issuance of debit cards rather than credit cards was 
compelled, in part, by the lack of any national credit information system in China prior to 
2004.  Moreover, because 92% of personal consumption expenditure was in cash, it was 
logical to focus on displacing cash with debit cards85 rather than inducing Chinese 
75
 OECD Report on Consumer Protections for Payment Cardholders, supra, at 14-15.  Prof. Mann has 
argued that this distinction between debit and credit cards should be eliminated on functional grounds.  
Mann, supra, at 665.
76
 Geva, “Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers,” supra, at 252.  However, 
Denmark’s Consumer Ombudsman Guidelines include protections in case of non-delivery.  OECD Report 
on Consumer Protections for Payment Cardholders, supra, at 15.
77 Cards Int'l, 5/13/05, at 5, 2005 WLNR 8716395 (Westlaw).
78
“China Moves Up a Gear,” Cards Int’l, 5/22/97, 1997 WLNR 3406271 (Westlaw).  Figures for 1994 and 
1995 differ; the central bank figures are consistently lower than those reported by the card associations.  
Eight million is the number reported by state-owned banks.
79
 Andrew Ward, Financial Times, February 2, 2004.
80
 Compare the CUP 
81
 “China Set for Radical Payments Transformation,” Cards Int’l, 8/21/00, at 11, 2000 WLNR 4029837
(Westlaw); see also, “China learns western ways; Chinese banks' concentration on debit cards is a move 
which should aid growth in card issuance over the next decade,” Cards Int’l, 11/28/97, (page unavailable 
online), 1997 WLNR 3344379 (Westlaw).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84
 He Li-Ping, op. cit.
85 See “Analysis: Visa Asia-Pacific -- Staying on track,” Cards Int’l, 6/30/97, 1997 WLNR 3422020 
(Westlaw).
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consumers to change to an American-style credit card culture.  The Golden Payment Card 
program also was seen as a counterinflationary measure to control the money supply, a 
function that ruled out card-based credit.86  Accordingly, the cards are usable at ATM’s 
and points of sale, but do not have a credit function.
However, issuance of cards does not mean that they are used.  Only about three 
percent of China’s merchants accept payment cards.87  It is not uncommon for an 
individual to own six or seven debit cards.  “Sleeping cards” are a problem; about two-
thirds of the 685 million debit cards issued are unused,88 and recently the four state-
owned banks began to charge annual fees for debit cards in order to cull dormant cards.89
Other banks, however, have not followed suit.  Foreign banks, meanwhile, are forbidden 
from extending credit to persons other than foreigners until January 1, 2007.90
China remains predominantly a cash economy, but according to the Nilson 
Report, card spending grew to nearly 10% of all retail sales revenue in 2004 from 2.7% in 
2001, mostly on debit cards.91  People’s Bank of China gives a more conservative, but 
still telling, estimate that cards account for five percent of retail sales volume in 2004, up 
from two percent in 2001.92  However, payment cards accounted for as much as 20% of 
retail sales revenue in the major cities of Beijing and Shanghai.93
Credit cards have not gained as much in popularity as debit and prepaid cards, and 
overwhelmingly they are used for commercial purposes.  Of about 29 million credit cards 
extant in China as of June 2004, 24 million were secured by guarantee deposit accounts.94
These secured credit card accounts carry extremely high interest rates for overdrafts.  
Those credit cardholders that do exist in China rarely carry balances from month to 
month; as in Japan, credit cards are primarily used as cash substitutes in China.95
Prepaid cards are also becoming common in China,96 and the unbanked 
86
 “China Moves Up a Gear,” Cards Int’l, 5/22/97, 1997 WLNR 3406271 (Westlaw).
87
 “China Gears Up for EMV Migration,” Cards Int'l, 2/7/05, at 8, 2005 WLNR 3082697 (Westlaw) 
(“According to CUP [China UnionPay], the Chinese cards market had a merchant acceptance footprint of 
only 3 percent by the end of September 2004….”).
88
 “MasterCard Aims to Inform Chinese Card Market,” Cards Int'l, 2/7/05, at 8, 2005 WLNR 3082698
(Westlaw).
89
 “Chinese State Banks to Charge Debit Card Fees,” Cards Int’l, 5/13/05, at 5, 2005 WLNR 8716395 
(Westlaw).
90 Cards Int’l, 5/13/05, at 14,  2005 WLNR 8716446 (Westlaw).
91
 Asia Payment Systems, Inc. profile on http://profiles.shazamstocks.com, citing the Nilson Report, a 
payment card industry newsletter.
92
 “China Pacific Insurance to Issue Credit Cards,” Cards Int’l, 3/31/05, at 7, 2005 WLNR 6261362
(Westlaw).  Yet a third estimate, apparently by the central bank, placed bank card payments at 10% of all 
retail sales as early as 1999.  See “China Set for Radical Payments Transformation,” supra.
93
 “China Pacific Insurance to Issue Credit Cards,” op. cit.
94 SinoCast China Financial Watch December 9, 2004, “Singapore Bank Sets Up Representative Office in 
Dongguang,” available on Lexis News and Business under “China Country Files”; “China moves up a 
gear,”   Figures for credit cards outstanding in China vary wildly; the People’s Bank of China claims there
are as many as 98 million credit cards in circulation in China, while other reports give figures of 29 million 
and one million, respectively.  The 29 million figure comes from the CUP study of December 2004 and is 
estimated as of June 2004.
95
 According to one report, only 5% of Chinese credit cardholders revolve credit, compared with 75% in the 
U.S. who revolve credit at least once a year.  Asia Payment Systems, Inc. profile, op.cit., n. 15.
96 See, e.g., “Debit and Prepay Aligned at MasterCard,” Cards Int’l, 6/7/05, at 20 2005 WLNR 10149257
(Westlaw) (interview with Rick Lyons, global head of debit and prepaid card strategy at MasterCard; 
“Some of our largest prepaid programmes are in China….”).
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population remains large. Personal bank accounts started in the late 1980’s but became 
generally available only in April 2000, and checking accounts are generally limited to 
business and institutional users.97  ATM’s are scarce in many parts of China, and bank 
customers have to wait in line to deposit and withdraw cash. 
The Chinese government’s incentive to encourage electronic payments may have 
been bolstered by the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998.  Weak domestic consumption 
was seen as one of the culprits.  In 2000, South Korea took more extreme measures to 
encourage consumption, in the hope of warding off a repetition of the crisis.  In a debacle 
reminiscent of the October, 1966 credit card giveaway in Chicago98 which created the 
momentum for the enactment of the TILA, more than 57 million credit cards were issued 
within one year to South Koreans, with lax underwriting.  
Recipients did not, for the most part, use the cards for purchases; rather, they went 
on a binge of drawing cash advances and spent the cash.99 This credit card boom 
precipitated a bust in 2002 and a crisis of overindebtedness in South Korea, the effects of 
which are still reverberating in that country.100  The nation’s second-largest card issuer, 
LG Card, lost 5.59 trillion won (over five billion U.S. dollars) in a single year.101  Credit 
card issuance is growing rapidly in Thailand, but stricter underwriting there has resulted 
in more modest growth in consumer debt.102
B. Russia: Payroll Cards and Overdraft Credit
The American Chamber of Commerce in Russia describes the use of payment 
cards as “exploding throughout Russia.”103  About 22 million cards are in circulation and 
the number is expected to exceed 32 million by the end of 2006.104  However, only six 
percent of card transactions are retail payments; most cards are payroll cards used to 
withdraw cash from ATM’s.105   According to the Central Bank of Russia, 97% of the 
10.6 million cards issued by Visa and MasterCard in Russia are deferred debit cards 
linked to bank accounts.106  There are also 11.1 million “private label” cards, mostly debit 
cards, issued by domestic banks such as Sberbank.  Of the latter, 4.7 million are “smart 
97 He Li-Ping, “Facing the WTO Accession: Problems and Challenges in China’s Banking Industry,” 
Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (March 2001), 
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Industry: Federal Legislative Controls,” 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1475, 1478-1481 (1972).
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100
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cards,” using chip technology, that can be used for purposes other than payments.107
Most cards that are not payroll cards, possibly as many as nine million cards, are 
reportedly “overdraft” cards bearing high fees and only available for small overdrafts of 
bank accounts.108  Only about four percent of payment cards in Russia are credit cards.
The principal impetus to payment cards in Russia was the adoption of a flat tax of 
13% in 1998, which has substantially cut down on the past practice of “black” salary 
payments and resulted in direct deposit of salaries into bank accounts, linking many 
people to the banking system for the first time.  However, a major Russian online 
merchant, Yandex, reports credit cards “have yet to catch on in Russia,” so paid services 
on the Internet are not a big moneymaker.109  Bankers describe trying to “develop the 
payment culture of Russians” to “overcome a psychological barrier” and pay with credit 
cards, and do not expect credit cards to exceed 30% of all bankcards issued in Russia in 
2005.110  An amendment to Article 212 of the Taxation Code, effective February 1, 2005, 
gave banks permission to offer an interest-free grace period requirement on credit and 
overdraft cards – banks are otherwise forbidden from waiving interest on extensions of 
credit - which may enhance their attractiveness.111
C. Brazil: Debit Card Growth and the Cash Economy
According to one recent estimate, Brazil has 135 million debit cards and 45 
million credit cards in circulation.112  About one-third of Brazil’s population now has a 
bank account.113  The figure is about 43% for urban residents.114
Like China, Brazil is predominantly a cash economy.  77% of urban Brazilians 
continue to use cash for all payments, even utility bills.115  Of 70 billion dollars (U.S.) in 
annual private consumption, 15% is paid electronically.116  Checks never were a major 
way to make payments in Brazil; only 61% of bank account holders – about 20% of the 
population – even have access to checking facilities today, and this figure was far lower 
several years ago when credit cards were being introduced.117
Debit card transactions are growing in Brazil by 60% annually as opposed to 20% 
annual growth in credit card transactions.118  Meanwhile, check volume is decreasing by 
3.4% per year.119 While debit cards help preserve the predominant cash economy, 
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however, problems of overindebtedness involving credit card use are growing in Brazil.  
About 25% of Brazilian consumer bankruptcy cases involve credit card debts.120
While Brazil, the world’s ninth largest economy, represents by far the largest 
market for e-commerce in Latin America, exceeding 3.8 billion USD in e-commerce in 
2003, and has the largest number of Internet users in the region (14 million as of the end 
of 2003),121 as of 2001 only about two-thirds of Latin Americans who bought online were 
using any kind of payment card to make their purchase,122 while over 90% of Americans 
and Western Europeans use credit cards to make online purchases.  Also, the number of 
mobile telephone users, about 37.4 million as of the end of 2003, far exceeds the number 
of Internet users, and 10 million Brazilian consumers are expected to be using mobile 
payment systems by the end of 2005.123
D. Mexico: Prepaid Cards for the Unbanked
Mexico, the second largest market in Latin America, displays the same pattern as 
Brazil of the dominance of the cash economy and debit cards.  Fewer Mexicans than 
Brazilians are “banked”; only 25% of urban Mexicans have a bank account.124  However, 
75% of economically active Mexicans carry a debit or prepaid card, compared with just 
25% who carry a credit card.125  Only 12% of purchases in Mexico are made with credit 
cards,126 and only 160,000 businesses in the country of 105 million people accept credit 
cards.127  To make it easier for lower-income people to use cards, MasterCard in 2004 
began offering prepaid cards in Mexico.128
The spread of debit and prepaid cards has to a great extent coincided with the 
spread of mobile telephones, and the prepaid phone card is often the first exposure of 
consumers to electronic payments.  As in Brazil, mobile telephones dominate the 
Mexican telephone market; there are over 28 million of them, compared with fewer than 
half as many fixed lines.  The dominant way to pay for telephone service in Mexico is 
with prepaid phone cards; over 23 million of the 28 million mobile subscribers pay for 
120
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service in this way.129  The average denomination of phone card is $10 US, yet the 
average expenditure is about $12 US per month.130  This means that the average 
subscriber is buying a new phone card more than once a month.  TelCel, the dominant 
cellular telephone service provider, maintains over 400,000 points of sale for phone 
cards, including mom-and-pop stores and street vendors, to satisfy the demand.131
E. Southern Africa: Mobile Payments and Smart Cards
Nowhere has cell phone use grown more than in Africa over the past five years.132
As many as 97% of people surveyed in Tanzania said they had access to a mobile phone, 
though only 28% had access to a landline.133   Cell phones are revolutionizing African 
economies by overcoming barriers created by poor transportation networks, postal 
systems and fixed telephone systems.
Cell phones are starting to be used to make mobile payments in southern Africa.  
In Zambia, for example, 300 small businesses that sell Coca Cola have begun using cell 
phones to pay for their inventory.134  In Zambia, too, gasoline stations, dry cleaners, 
restaurants, and scores of other retail shops let customers pay by cell phone.135
Only about forty percent of the population of the Republic of South Africa has a 
bank account,136 but the SIM cards used in the GSM cellular phones that are standard in 
South Africa are “smart cards” that contain microchips and are capable of performing 
payment functions.137  As of January 1, 2005, all new debit and credit cards issued in 
South Africa are required to be smart cards, and all pension payments handled by the 
South African Department of Social Welfare will move to a smart card system from 2005 
onward.138  Visa cards are growing by about 43% per year in South Africa,139 but debit 
cards are growing more than credit cards, as the lack of bank accounts and lack of 
creditworthiness of much of the population limits the issuance of credit cards.140
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F. India: Debit Cards and Access to Bank Services
In India, debit cards have become immensely popular, while credit card 
penetration is low and credit card holders tend to pay their balances in full each month.141
One reason may be that Indians, despite their generally impoverished condition, have a 
relatively high rate of owning a bank account.  A survey of residents o f Uttar Pradesh and 
rural Andhra Pradesh revealed that 47.5% had bank accounts.142  The high population 
density in India, even in rural areas, means that large numbers of people live close to a 
bank branch.  Thus, while the average population per branch in Brazil was 9,331 and the 
area per branch was 470 sq. km., the corresponding figures in India were 14,888 and 44 
sq. km., respectively.143
Mobile payments, however, have not yet become common in India as they have in 
southern Africa.  Sumitomo Bank, together with a Chicago-based company, has just 
recently introduced a “mobile electronic wallet” as a service to its customers, but it is a 
luxury item for the affluent.144  Elsewhere in Asia, however, particularly in South Korea, 
mobile payments are rapidly increasing in use.145
However, globally mobile payments are hampered by the slow speeds at which 
most mobile telecommunications networks still operate, and by high per-minute charges 
for use of cell phones in developing countries, especially where mobile telephone service 
suffers from monopolistic or oligopolistic practices.  As G3 packet switched data 
networks, the newest and fastest GSM mobile telephone systems, become more 
widespread and as calling charges go down, mobile payments are expected to rapidly 
gain popularity as a way to make small payments, particularly in high crime areas where 
carrying cash and payment cards presents a risk of theft.146
IV. Debit and Prepaid Cards in Developed Economies
A. Marginalization of Credit Card Culture
As debit and prepaid cards proliferate globally, the American and Canadian 
addiction to credit cards is increasingly marginalized.  Meanwhile, Western and Central 
Europe and Scandinavia are divided into two payment cultures.  Some countries like 
Germany rely heavily on giros, which are deferred debit transactions,147 while in others 
such as France and the United Kingdom credit cards have a larger profile, though not 
141
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nearly as large as in North America.
In Japan, credit card use also exceeds debit and prepaid card use.  However, Japan 
maintains the institution of ikkai barai, loosely translated as “payment in one cycle.”  In 
about 85% of Japanese credit card transactions the card is used to arrange a prescheduled 
debit transfer as in the case of the giro in Europe.  At the cash register, the consumer 
makes the decision that the transaction will be paid to the issuer in full on the next 
monthly payment date, and authorizes a debit transfer out of his or her account to pay the 
transaction shortly after the last day of the payment cycle.  “Because the cardholder at the 
point of purchase already has given the issuer access to a specified amount of funds in a 
specified account, the transaction resembles much more closely an American debit card 
transaction than an American credit card transaction.”148  Apart from Japan and the credit 
card giveaway in South Korea, nowhere in Asia or other developing regions are credit 
cards as widely used as debit and prepaid cards.  
The failure to recognize the anomalous nature of American and Canadian 
payment culture is a flaw in the work of the leading American scholar on payment 
systems, Ronald Mann.  In a 2002 article149 Prof. Mann attempted to explain why 
Japanese consumers use both credit cards and debit cards far less than American 
consumers, and why when they use credit cards, the payment arrangements tend to 
resemble a deferred debit transfer rather than a loan, with the balance automatically 
deducted from the cardholder’s bank account at the end of a billing cycle.
Calling the credit card “the dominant card-based payment system in the world,”150
Prof. Mann concluded that the credit card is “likely to languish as a relatively minor 
system” in Japan, because “[f]inancial systems that develop in one country cannot be 
transplanted without change to other countries that have different institutional 
settings.”151  Yet, even in 2002, credit cards were not the dominant card-based payment 
system outside North America and a few countries in Western Europe.  The immensity of 
the American economy obscures the status of Americans as outliers in relying on credit 
cards as a source of financing instead of convenience.
Moreover, payments by direct debit transfer in Japan dwarf the volume of 
payments by credit card.  53% of all non-cash payments in 1990, and 51% in 1997, in 
Japan were by direct debit transfer compared with 9% and 10% of payments by credit 
card and 9% and 5% by check in those years, respectively.152  Direct debit transfer –
authorizing a merchant to debit one’s bank account – is also a dominant payment method 
in Germany – the giro - and is common in the UK, France and Italy.153 The dominance 
of direct debit and ikkai barai is functionally consistent with payment methods common 
both in Japan and Europe, but differs from the use of credit cards in North America.
Japan is not an anomaly with a unique payment culture.  Rather, there is a 
functional equivalence between Japanese use of credit cards as “convenience cards,”
payment by direct debit transfer, and the use of debit and prepaid cards for convenience 
148 See Ronald Mann, “Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the United States and Japan,” 55 Vand. L. Rev. 
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in much of the world outside North America.154 Japanese cardholders prefer to have the 
option of rolling over a balance on their cards, an option that debit cardholders in China, 
Russia or India do not yet have due to both a lack of credit information systems and their 
relatively impoverished circumstances; but the Japanese exercise that option relatively 
infrequently.  Moreover, Prof. Mann himself has more recently noted the trend in the 
United States toward (or back to) use of credit cards for convenience rather than as a 
source of financing.155
In 2005, nowhere other than in the United States and, arguably, Canada do credit 
cards still predominate among card-based payment systems.156  Even in the UK, where 
payment habits before the advent of payment cards were more similar to those in the 
United States than in continental Europe, the debit card payment volume of £108 billion 
in 2003 exceeded credit card volume of about £100 billion.157  Given the trend in favor of 
debit card use even in the United States and Canada, they might not continue to 
predominate there, either.  However, if Americans are unable to substantially change 
their payment habits, it is they who will remain out of step with the rest of the world in 
their use of credit cards.
As long ago as 1999 – a long time when discussing payment cards - the Bank for 
International Settlements study of the G10 countries and Australia recognized the trend
toward debit card dominance: “[O]nly in Canada, Japan and the United States are credit 
card payments still a significantly greater percentage of non-cash payments than debit 
cards.”158  Prof. Mann’s study of the Japanese use of credit cards demonstrates that even 
in Japan, the dominance of the credit card as a non-cash payment method is illusory.159
B. Europe: Checks and Giros
One European scholar has summed up payment habits in Europe as follows:  “As 
far as payment habits are concerned, traditionally there were two groups of countries in 
Europe.  On one side, Germany and the Netherlands characterized by large use of cash in 
retail payments and transfers for remote transactions, and France and the UK on the other 
side, where typically less [sic] retail payments were in cash, cheques were also largely 
used.”160  In her view, checks “actually constituted an intermediate step between cash and 
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157
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cards.”161
Credit cards came into regular use in Europe not long after they did in the United 
States, in the 1960’s, but did not receive the same degree of acceptance.  The difference 
in acceptance has much to do with differences in preexisting payment traditions: the 
check in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France and Italy, direct credit 
(account to account or “A2A”) and direct debit elsewhere in Europe.
In Germany, the Benelux countries, Switzerland and Scandinavia, unlike the U.S., 
the most common consumer payment system is the giro, a form of payment instruction 
that traditionally was in hard copy like a check.  In the giro the consumer can authorize a 
merchant, such as a utility company, to withdraw payments from her bank account as a
direct debit transfer.  Giros are commonly used to pay utility bills, telephone bills, taxes, 
and other recurring obligations, and they are used in other countries such as Singapore as 
well as in Europe.  Giros could also take the form of a credit transfer; for example, a 
common, and early, form of giro was the “postal giro” in which an amount was deposited 
by the consumer at the Post Office together with instructions to pay creditors.  In the mid-
1960’s, while American consumers were opening checking accounts in record numbers 
and beginning to open credit card accounts, many European merchants were automating 
their systems so that consumers could actuate a giro electronically at the point of sale.  In 
areas where the giro was well-established, neither checks nor credit cards became 
popular.  
Two studies from 1999 and 2001 illustrate this point; and it must be borne in 
mind that if anything, checks see greater use in Europe, for example, than they did fifty 
years ago.  While in the U.S. as of 2001, almost 60% of non-cash payment transactions in 
number were by check, only in France among the other G7 countries did the percentage 
exceed 30%.162  While 74% of non-cash payment volume in the U.S. as of 1997 was by 
check, and the figure had been as high as 82% six years earlier, in no other country 
among the G10 countries and Australia did it exceed France’s 46%.  Other than in 
France, and Australia at 41%, in no other country among the G10 and Australia did 
checks exceed 32% of non-cash payment volume, and in many checks are almost 
unknown.163
Results of the Bank for International Settlements 1999 study, based on 1990 and 
1997 data, are shown in the chart below:164
Table 1: Share of Non-Cash Payments, 1990/1997 (%)
Credit Card Debit Card Check Credit 
Transfer
Direct Debit
Australia 11/14 4/20 56/41 21/20 8/5
Belgium 2/3 8/19 24/8 58/60 8/10
Canada 30/31 0/22 63/31 4/9 3/7
1999) (“ESTO EPS Study”), at 89, referring to the UK, France and Italy as “cheque countries,” and most of 
the other EU countries as “giro countries.”
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France 0/0 14/22 60/46 16/18 10/14
Germany 1/2 0/2 10/6 52/48 42/37
Italy 1/7 0/5 46/32 50/46 3/10
Japan 9/10 0/0 9/5 29/34 53/51
Netherlands 0/0 2/18 15/3 62/52 21/27
Sweden 0/1 5/17 15/2 73/76 4/7
Switzerland 4/4 3/9 6/1 85/72 2/4
UK 11/13 3/18 52/31 21/19 13/19
US 16/19 0/4 82/74 1/2 1/1
Prof. Laura Rinaldi calls checks an “intermediate step between cash and cards.”165
There is an intuitive logic to this theory.  The credit card system depends on the 
cardholder’s paying the card issuer by another means of payment.  One cannot pay off a 
credit card with another credit card payment, except through a balance transfer, and at
some point, there has to be a way of paying the bill.  
However, in the case of a country like Germany where remote transactions 
traditionally were paid by giro, checks would be an unnecessary step, as giro would be 
more secure for the merchant and in a jurisdiction with a non-par checking system, 
perhaps less costly.  Nor would an evolution from giro to credit card make sense, unless 
the consumer intends to carry a balance as a loan; using a credit card would then require a 
further payment transaction to pay the credit card invoice, either a check or a giro.  In a 
cash-and-carry culture in which consumers normally pay either in cash or by a direct 
debit or credit transfer – i.e., in which one’s intent was to commit to transfer funds to the 
card issuer as payment in full, either immediately or at the end of the month – as in Japan 
and Germany, paying by credit card would serve no purpose other than, perhaps, 
reallocating some of the burden of processing from the merchant to the card issuer.  In 
other words, while an evolutionary progression from cash to checks to credit cards makes 
sense, a progression from cash to giro to cards would not.
Moreover, if credit cards become part of payment culture more readily in 
countries in which consumers first become accustomed to paying bills by check, one 
would expect to see a pattern of usage of checks and credit cards.  Yet, in France, for 
example, checks are the dominant method of payment, yet credit card usage is extremely 
low, while debit card usage is increasing.166
It is sometimes assumed that the absence of checks in a national payment culture 
makes it easy for payment cards to make inroads in a consumer population.  Bankers, 
including the Federal Reserve, often conceive of checks as a competing payment system.  
However, evidence from Spain does not bear this out.  Consumer payments by check in 
Spain have never been as widespread as in Italy, the UK and France.167  “Partly because 
of that,” said a leading European Commission-funded study, “Spain entered the stage of 
payment cards quickly.”168  Yet, when Visa Espana and Spanish banks installed 
“abundant” POS terminals and issued a large number of payment cards, they found that 
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consumers were not using the cards – they continued to use cash.169
C.  The North American Credit Card Habit
1. Explaining the Habit
If acquiring a check-writing habit pre-ordains acceptance of credit cards, the 
United States provides a good example.  Americans acquired a check-writing habit with 
the assistance of the Federal Reserve Board which subsidized the costs of the U.S. check 
clearing and collection system from 1918 to 1980.  Beginning in 1915, the Federal 
Reserve Board set up a national check clearing and collection system.  Obviously there 
were substantial costs of this system, totaling up to 500 million dollars per year, but from 
1918 to 1980 the U.S. Federal Reserve Board elected to have the American taxpayer 
absorb those costs by operating the system free of cost to member banks in order to 
maintain check collection at par.170  Thus, a bank customer who deposited a check for 
$100 would, in fact, be credited with $100 in his or her account, not $100 minus a fee for 
the cost of clearing and collecting the check.
The use of checks grew enormously in the post-war United States, and checking 
account customers were among the first to receive credit cards.  In 1966 when Bank of 
America decided to “go national” with the BankAmericard, predecessor to Visa, 
competing banks in Chicago sent four million unsolicited credit cards to their existing 
checking account customers, as well as other consumers they could identify, in an effort 
to build their credit card business.171  It was the massive fraud resulting from this incident 
that provided the initial impetus for TILA provisions prohibiting the distribution of 
unsolicited credit cards.
Prof. Mann, in his recent Georgetown Law Journal article,172 has pointed to the 
increasing use of credit cards as convenience cards.  This is not new, but a return to pre-
1983 habits.  Prior to about 1983 most American credit cardholders carried relatively low 
balances, and they were stable or declined over time.173  However, after 1983 in the 
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but to virtually anyone whose name they could obtain in the Chicago area.  One man received seven cards 
from a single bank in one day, and another received 18 cards in a three-day period.  Young children 
received cards; postal clerks stole unmailed cards and sold them on the black market.  The result was chaos 
and massive fraud.  See also David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Paying With Plastic: the Digital 
Revolution in Buying and Borrowing (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005) (2d ed.) (“Evans and 
Schmalensee”), 72-73.
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 Mann, supra, at 656.
173 See Business Week (Industrial Edition), October 18, 1982, at 30, Westlaw 1982 WLNR 371774 (“The 
US consumer debt load in relation to income has fallen to its lowest point in 20-30 years….Although 
revolving credit, mostly credit cards, accounts for 40-45% of total consumer credit extensions and 66% of 
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Shearson/American Express economist] sees the reason being that consumers use a lot of credit as a 
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United States average credit card balances surged.174 As interest rates started to come 
down in 1983, consumers ran up credit card debt, as shown in Table 2.  The termination 
of Federal Reserve subsidization of the check clearing and settlement system in 1980 
also, by 1983, resulted in the imposition of checking account fees.  Meanwhile, interest-
bearing money market accounts (“NOW accounts”) became available as a way of 
avoiding the fees and earning interest on deposits that were seen as rapidly losing value 
due to high inflation; however, those accounts were limited to two checks per month.  
Thus, there was an economic incentive for consumers to charge purchases, then pay for 
them with a check drawn on a money-market account.175
Table 2: Credit Card Balances and Interest Rates in the United States
Year Average balance 
per card with an 
active balance
% carrying a 
balance176
Average most 
common 
interest rate on 
credit cards177
1969 $776178 n.a. n.a.
1983 $751179 56.6 18.78
1989 $1362 57.9 18.02
1992 $1366 59.0 17.78
1995 $1852 61.9 15.79
convenient substitute for cash, as over half pay off credit-card balances at the end of every 
month…[However,] consumer credit repayments as a percent of disposable income have been declining 
steadily….”)  To the same effect, see Boston Globe, March 12, 1980, [page unavailable online], Westlaw 
1980 WLNR 78934 (State Street Bank of Boston official testified the bank would have to leave the credit 
card business if denied permission to charge $10 annual membership fee due to consistent losses; 
“[b]ankers have attributed the credit card squeeze to their rising cost of funds due to spiraling interest rates, 
increased operating costs, and the fact that many of their cardholders pay off their card balances month to 
month….”); Roland E. Brandel and Carl A. Leonard, “Bank Charge Cards: New Cash or New Credit,” 69 
Mich. L. Rev. 1033, 1060 (1971) (noting significant reduction in revolving credit card balances between 
1969 and 1970).
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175 See Jeanne Iida, “Fed's revised prices for check clearing, electronic payments spark cries of 'unfair.' 
Federal Reserve Board pricing initiative,” American Banker, vol. 158, no. 218, p. 17 (November 15, 1993).  
See also “Lies, Damned Lies, and M1 Statistics,” Forbes, May 23, 1983, at 25, attributing some of the rise 
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with cash or building credit card balances and then paying with large checks drawn on money market 
accounts.
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While in the 1977-83 period banks had cut back on issuing new credit cards,180 as 
the economy improved in the 1980’s, banks loosened underwriting criteria and 
consumers flocked in droves,181 attracted by interest rates that were fairly nominal when 
adjusted for inflation which peaked in 1981 at around 13%.182  Accordingly, from 1980 to 
June 1985, the average outstanding balance on active Visa and MasterCard credit card 
accounts increased 28% in real (inflation-adjusted) dollars, while the number of accounts 
grew by 41%.183
After 1983, however, the cost of funds to banks dropped from 13.5% to three 
percent by the mid-1990’s, yet credit card interest rates remained virtually unaffected.  
As credit card balances rose in the mid-1980’s, banks showed an abrupt increase in the 
profitability of their credit card operations, and credit card interest rates displayed 
reduced sensitivity to changes in the cost of funds.184 Various attempts have been made 
to explain why competition among the more than 4,000 card issuing banks did not lead 
credit card interest rates to follow these decreases in the cost of funds.  Evans and 
Schmalensee argue that issuer profits in fact fell during the 1990’s and that the high 
interest rates were therefore justified by higher costs other than the cost of funds, such as 
charge-offs due to consumer bankruptcies.  Lawrence Ausubel posited that “many 
consumers systematically underestimate the extent of their current and future credit card 
borrowing and, using these underestimates, make suboptimal decisions regarding the 
choice and usage of credit cards.”185
A consumer who thinks she can pay off her credit card balance whenever she 
wants to will be less inclined to worry about the interest rate.  The American consumer 
was abetted in making her change of payment habits permanent by the escalation in home 
values of the late 1980’s and 1990’s.  As long as refinancing home mortgages and 
thereby paying off accumulated credit card balances was an option, consumers did not 
180
 Evans and Schmalensee, supra, at 97.
181
 This is dramatically shown in Figure 4.3 in Evans and Schmalensee, supra, at 97.  The only exception 
was the lowest income quintile of the population.  See also Robert D. Manning, Credit Card Nation: the 
Consequences of America’s Addiction to Credit (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
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1997, available at: 
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cost of funds to banks at one point reached 16%.
183
 Christopher DeMuth, “The Case Against Credit Card Interest Rate Regulation,” 3 Yale J. on Reg. 201 
(1986), at n. 39.  Apparently either there was a dip in, or in years leading up to, 1980 or most of the 28% 
increase was between 1983 and 1985, given the statistics shown in Table 2.
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 Ausubel, supra, n.111, at 261, citing Lawrence M. Ausubel, “The Failure of Competition in the Credit
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worry too much as their balances grew.186
2. Resistance to Debit Cards
While differences between American payment habits and payment habits 
elsewhere may have been shaped by historical factors such as the preexisting use of 
checks or giros and inflation and the costs of credit at a crucial stage in the development 
of consumer payment habits, it is the fee structure that shaped early resistance to debit 
cards in the United States.  Given the choice between being charged a $1.00 or $1.50 fee 
by their bank to use a debit card at a point of sale and no fee to use a credit card, 
consumers chose the credit card, even when they had a revolving balance and would be
charged interest in excess of the fee they avoided.  In contrast, debit card fees at the point 
of sale are relatively unusual in Europe, and only a small percentage of prepaid cards 
involve payment of a per-transaction fee.
This phenomenon of incurring interest-bearing debt in order to avoid imposition 
of an immediate fee is consistent with what behavioral economists call “hyperbolic 
discounting,” the tendency for consumers to have higher discount rates for events 
perceived as likely to occur far in the future than they do for events likely to occur in the 
immediate future.187  One may never have to pay interest if the credit card balance is paid 
currently, and in any event it is not incurred immediately and the amount is not known, 
whereas the $1.00 or $1.50 fee imposed by one’s bank for use of a debit card at the point 
of sale or at another bank’s ATM is charged immediately and is in a known or at least, 
predictable amount.
However, since 2000, debit card payment volumes and cards in circulation have 
grown rapidly in the United States.  From 2000 to 2003, use of debit cards in the United 
States grew 23.5% per year compared with 6.7% for credit cards,188 totaling 15.6 billion 
debit card transactions compared with 19 billion credit card transactions in 2003.189
Debit cards today (2005) are used in about one third of all in-store transactions in the 
United States, compared with 20% four years ago.190  Per household debit card spending, 
$5,322 as of 2003, are expected to nearly double by 2008.191  However, debit card 
payment volume remained less than half of credit card volume as of 2004.192
Debit cards have fared better still in Canada.  In Canada in 2002, there were 
already more debit card transactions than credit card transactions, but credit card 
186 See Ben Weberman, “Second Thoughts on Second Mortgages,” Forbes, October 5, 1987, at 42 (citing 
banker’s complaints that home equity lending was cannibalizing more profitable credit card lending).
187 See Mann, supra, at 651-652; Stefano Dellavigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Contract Design and Self-
Control: Theory and Evidence, 119 Q.J. Econ. 353 (2004); Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and 
Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. Econ. Lit. 351, 360 (2002); Jonathan Gruber & Botond Koszegi, 
Is Addiction "Rational"? Theory and Evidence, 116 Q.J. Econ. 1261 (2001); George Lowenstein & Richard 
H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, J. Econ. Persp., Fall 1989, at 181, 184-87 (discussing 
dynamic inconsistency in discount rates); Richard H. Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic 
Inconsistency, 8 Econ. Letters 201, 202 (1981).
188
 2004 Federal Reserve Payments Study, December 15, 2004, at 8, available at 
http://www.frbservices.org/Retail/pdf/2004PaymentResearchReport.pdf. 
189 Ibid. 
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purchases still totaled CD 135.7 billion compared to debit card use of CD 104.9 
billion.193  However, debit card fraud is also higher in Canada than in the United 
States.194
V. Consumer Protection Policy Issues
A. Who Makes the Rules?   Private Lawmaking and Public Policy in the 
Regulation of Debit and Prepaid Card Transactions
Prof. Mann, in his recent Georgetown Law Journal article, asserts, “At its heart, 
payments law must resolve four fundamental questions: who bears the risk of 
unauthorized payments; what must be done about claims of error; when payments are 
completed so that they discharge the underlying liability; and when they can be reversed. 
The first three questions are categorically different from the last because they often 
should be resolved based on the nature of the underlying technology….”195  Mann goes 
on to argue that reversibility of payment card transactions is different, due to the 
inequality of bargaining power between consumers and merchants, and that the TILA 
legal regime designed to protect consumers against making imprudent borrowing 
decisions, largely through disclosure requirements, should be reconsidered, as to payment 
cards, as a means of “redressing an imbalance of leverage.”196
Parenthetically, it is odd that Prof. Mann omits any mention of regulation of fees
and penalties charged by banks for the use of payment cards.  In 2004, the highest 
percentage of all complaints to the Federal Reserve regarding state member banks 
concerned card fees and penalties.197 The same is true of complaints about banks in the 
U.K.198 To exclude laws (or the lack thereof) regarding the cost of making a payment
from “payments law” is analogous to excluding wage-hour laws, governing the cost of 
labor, from “employment law,” or excluding rules regarding brokerage commissions and 
the pricing of securities offerings from “securities law.”
Prof. Mann is not the first to call for reform of reversibility rules in payment card 
transactions.199  One EC study said, “In relation to debit cards, charge back rules are 
necessary, providing the consumer with the right to have the money transferred back on 
193 www.epaynews.com, “Debit Card Fraud is a Growing Problem in Canada,” June 18, 2003 (last updated 
April 22, 2005).
194 See Note 28, supra.
195
 Mann, supra, at 653.
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Urban Affairs Committee, May 17, 2005, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2005/20050517/default.htm. 
198 See House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, Transparency of Credit Card Charges, 
Memorandum from the National Consumer Council, 20 June 2003, available at 
www.ncc.org.uk/moneymatters/treasury20june.pdf.
199 See, e.g., “Study on Consumer Law and the Information Society,” prepared by PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
for European Commission, Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General, August 17, 2000 (“EC 
Study on Consumer Law and the Information Society”), Executive Summary at pp. 2 and 5, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/surveys/sur20_en.html (reform a “high priority” 
considering “absence of binding EU rules, and citing charge backs and reconsideration of the relationship 
between the cardholder and the card issuer as areas of special concern “in view of the prepay model that 
seems to join in with the Internet”).
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his demand, not only in case of fraud, but also where he avails himself of the right of 
withdrawal [from the contract with the merchant].”200  The same study cited the need for 
an “open and flexible regime” of consumer protection that could adapt to new payment 
methods as they developed, and the consumer’s lack of anonymity online as mandating 
privacy concerns.201  However, the study also emphasized the need for legislation rather 
than reliance on self-regulation.
The proliferation of debit and prepaid cards in developing countries has been met 
with regulatory inaction in most places.  If the governments of developing countries such 
as China, Brazil and India fail to establish regimes to regulate payment cards and, in Prof. 
Mann’s words, “redress an imbalance of leverage,” then the question is whether the 
payment card industry can be expected to do so itself as a set of private lawmakers.  
Whether an imbalance of leverage with respect to reversibility will be redressed 
voluntarily depends to some degree on the relationship between the perceived difficulty 
of obtaining new merchants for the payment card association and the perceived difficulty 
of attracting consumers to apply for and to use their cards.  
There has been little difficulty in most countries in attracting consumers to obtain 
debit and prepaid cards, as discussed above.  In China, the process has been hastened by 
government intervention.  With respect to credit cards, a key limiting factor in most parts 
of the developing world, with the notable exception of the South Korean credit card 
debacle, has been banks’ unwillingness to issue them, largely due to the lack of credit 
information systems.  Moreover, as discussed above, consumers in most countries, and 
even the majority of consumers in the U.S., tend to use credit cards for convenience 
rather than run up an unpaid balance.  Debit and prepaid cards do not present (at least, not 
in the absence of an overdraft line of credit) an opportunity to indulge in 
overindebtedness.
The primary limitation on the use of debit cards is the reluctance of merchants to 
make the investment in equipment necessary to accept payment cards.  That is why there 
are so many “sleeping cards” in China; that is why South Koreans used their sudden 
credit card wealth to take cash advances and spent the cash; that is why the proliferation 
of debit cards in Brazil has not reduced the use of cash to the same extent as the 
proliferation of credit cards did in the United States.
As long as private lawmakers in banks and card associations perceive that, on a 
global level, consumers are more anxious to obtain and use payment cards than 
merchants are to sign up and install the necessary equipment, their tendency will be to 
make private laws that are favorable to merchants rather than consumers.
Another major factor is that it is banks and merchants, not consumers, that 
comprise the membership of card associations, and the private lawmakers are bankers 
and their attorneys.  It is not surprising that association rules favor members of the 
association over consumers, who are outsiders to the network.
The status of consumers as outsiders to the card association damages both the 
transparency and legitimacy of self-regulation.  Because the Visa and MasterCard 
200
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associations regard chargeback procedures as ways of allocating losses between banks, 
and not between consumers and merchants, they decline to disclose the rules to that 
govern chargeback procedures to anyone not affiliated with a member financial 
institution or regulatory agency.  The rationale given by Visa USA is that the rules are 
“proprietary and confidential information” in the nature of trade secrets, valuable to 
someone who might want to start a competing system.202
This rationale is both implausible and insufficient.  It is implausible, because there 
are not likely to be any major new credit and debit card networks coming on the scene 
that would significantly benefit from copying Visa’s and MasterCard’s chargeback 
procedures.  Other network associations such as the National Automated Clearing House 
Association publish their rules and procedures and freely sell copies to non-members.  It 
is insufficient, because consumers have an interest in the rules that govern chargebacks, 
since they affect the willingness of card issuers to recredit consumers’ accounts.  Issuers 
frequently recredit accounts even when not obligated to do so by consumer protection 
laws, but it is important that such recrediting be done in a fair and non-discriminatory 
fashion in accordance with rules and following adequate investigation of the consumer’s 
complaint.  
Besides lack of transparency, another defect in chargeback procedures is their 
unfairness to the consumer.  Again, because network associations regard chargeback 
procedures as a private matter between their member banks rather than a consumer 
protection system, the procedures are not designed to ensure that the consumer’s voice is 
heard or that her interests are adequately represented.  
The primary unfairness of the chargeback system to consumers lies in the fact that 
in case of a dispute, nothing requires the issuer to do more than take the merchant’s word 
for what happened.  As a practical matter, this means that if the facts are in material 
dispute, the issuer is likely to restore the charge to the consumer’s bill, on the theory that 
the consumer has no defense to liability to the merchant, and leave it to the consumer to 
pursue other remedies against the merchant – not an effective means of redress in many 
cases.  
Although American consumers have the right under TILA §170, subject to certain 
limitations, to withhold payment from the issuing bank if they have paid with a credit 
card and have a defense against the merchant, it is the unusual consumer who would risk 
losing as much as 100 points in her credit score, as well as loss of credit card charging 
privileges, by doing so.  For these reasons, the volume of chargebacks in the United 
States, which Prof. Mann characterizes as “quite small,”203 cannot be considered evidence 
that consumers are overwhelmingly satisfied with the goods and services they purchase, 
or that unauthorized transactions or other grounds for reversal of transactions are de 
minimis.  The high volume of complaints to the Federal Trade Commission about identity 
theft in credit card transactions204 and the stagnant indices of consumer satisfaction in 
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market research studies205 are evidence to the contrary.
Moreover, although chargeback rules generally provide for arbitration of disputes 
between issuing banks and merchant acquirers, e.g., if the merchant is insolvent so that 
one of the banks will bear the loss, this procedure only becomes applicable if the issuing 
bank initiates a chargeback, and it is has no incentive to do so unless compelled by public 
law to recredit the consumer’s account.  The consumer lacks any right to initiate or 
participate in the arbitration process – no right to invoke a hearing, no right to be present 
or ask questions, no right even to know what the rules are.
That is not to say that the bodies of private law created by banks to govern 
payment networks are entirely one-sided.  For instance, the Operating Rules of the 
National Automated Clearing House Association (“NACHA”), which govern ACH 
payments in the U.S. and Canada, provide consumers the right to be “promptly credited” 
with the amount of an unauthorized debit entry upon submittal of an affidavit demanding 
the money.206  In contrast, the U.S. Electronic Funds Transfer Act (“EFTA”) gives banks 
ten business days to complete an investigation and recredit the consumer’s account in 
case of an unauthorized electronic funds transfer.207
Banks and bank networks that operate payment systems have a number of reasons 
to promulgate private rules that are not one-sided.  First, banks and bank networks 
generally have an interest in avoiding or minimizing the extent of government regulation 
of new payment systems.  When they have been regarded as being greedy and unfair in 
treating consumers, legislatures have been prodded into enacting prophylactic legislation 
to remedy the perceived abuses.  A good example is the Expedited Funds Availability 
Act,208 enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1987 in response to an outcry over banks’ placing 
extended and unwarranted holds on deposits into customer accounts.
Second, banks and bank networks have an interest in uniformity.  As networks 
become global in scope, the risk of attracting adverse regulatory action by overreaching is 
compounded.  A network that spans five countries must keep five governments happy.  If 
any one is aroused to act, the network will have to change its rules accordingly, not just 
in that single country, but network-wide.  The widespread consequences of a misstep in 
self-regulation that makes the system appear too unfair toward consumers mean that 
banks and bank networks have an interest in maintaining a margin of safety.  They not 
only have an interest in being perceived as staying off the toes of consumers, but in 
appearing to remain at least a few inches away from them.
At the same time, however, banks and bank networks have less need to be 
concerned about governmental regulation in countries with small domestic markets.  For 
example, Visa International and its regional cooperatives, in designing its policies for 
Africa, are likely to be guided more by a desire to satisfy merchants in South Africa , the 
largest African market, than by concern about adverse regulation in Burundi.  Visa might 
credibly threaten to curtail operations in a small, impoverished country, but not in a larger 
market.  
It has been argued that private lawmaking may be more likely to yield rules that 
205 See http://www.theacsi.org/national_scores.htm.   The American Customer Satisfaction Index National 
Quarterly Score is significantly lower as of second quarter 2005 than it was in 1994.  Id.
206 NACHA Op. Rules §7.6.1.  
207 EFTA §908(c). 15 U.S.C. §1693f.
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promote efficiency where there is “regulatory competition.”209   However, Visa and 
MasterCard as private lawmakers are more likely to compete to attract merchants than 
consumers.  Indeed, Visa has cited competition as its reason for keeping its chargeback 
rules secret from the public.210
Overall, it is unlikely under present conditions that banks and card associations 
will voluntarily adopt a reversibility regime that grants global consumers effective 
chargeback rights.  The fact is, for example, that their interest in uniformity has not been 
strong enough to result in the universal extension of chargeback rights to product- and 
service-related disputes, as TILA §170 did for many American consumers who purchase 
with credit cards.  The economic power of the U.S. market makes it worthwhile for banks 
and card associations to comply with §170, but the rights granted by that section are 
treated as idiosyncratic rights of consumers in the U.S. and those few other countries with 
parallel legislation, not as a model to be followed globally.
This evidence raises troubling inferences for consumers in emerging economies 
where debit and prepaid cards are proliferating.  In many places these consumers may 
face greater risk of merchant misconduct than consumers in the developed world, due to 
the lack of effective law enforcement and unfamiliarity with modern payment systems.  
Yet, overwhelmingly payment card issuers and card associations are self-regulating in 
emerging economies, more so than in the U.S. and Western Europe where consumer 
protection has a longer history.  Nowhere is there a greater need for legislation to redress
the imbalance of leverage between consumers and merchants than in emerging 
economies.
B. Reversibility of Debit and Prepaid Card Transactions
1. Transparency and Reversibility: a Proposal
Transparency in the chargeback system could play an important role in redressing 
the existing imbalance of leverage between consumer and merchant.  Private lawmaking 
by card associations has rejected transparency, yet little thought seems to have been given 
to date to legislation that would mandate a degree of transparency for the benefit of 
consumers.
Private lawmaking by payment card associations has eschewed transparency for at 
least two reasons.  First, as discussed above, competition for merchants is more keen than 
competition for consumers, especially in global markets in which payment cards are 
proliferating faster than merchants equipped to accept them.  Second, as behavioral 
economists have observed, consumers tend not to consider the possibility of something 
going wrong at the time when they enter into a transaction, let alone when they apply for 
209
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a payment card that will facilitate future transactions; therefore, a transparent system for 
resolving disputes would not confer any significant advantage on card issuers in 
competing for consumer accounts.
The chargeback system lacks transparency in two particularly important respects.  
First, the rules of the system, and the right to participate in chargeback arbitrations, are
open only to card association members.211  Second, perhaps more importantly, data about 
the chargeback experience of individual merchants is kept confidential.  
The card associations’ claim that chargeback rules are a trade secret has been 
discussed above.  However, more important is the unavailability of information about the 
chargeback experience of individual merchants  If a specific merchant has engaged in 
misrepresentation of its merchandise or sold poor quality merchandise, resulting in a high 
number of chargebacks, this is information that consumers should have available to them 
when they are shopping.  
Because card associations compete, through merchant acquirers, for merchant 
memberships, and because merchants presumably prefer to keep negative information 
about themselves confidential, it is in the interest of the associations to promise 
merchants that chargeback information will be kept secret from the public.  
Compare the card associations’ incentives with those of eBay, the online auction 
service.  eBay posts data about online merchants, including consumer ratings and 
complaints, that is available to consumers when they make a purchase.  Online merchants 
have to overcome the remoteness of the transaction – consumers often are unfamiliar 
with the merchant, yet have to rely on the merchant’s representations about merchandise 
they cannot hold in their hands –  in gaining consumers’ trust.  eBay, anticipating this 
problem, chose to require merchants to consent to release of data about them.
Visa and MasterCard could compile the same data as eBay, but they do not, or at 
least, they do not make such data accessible to the public.  It is in consumers’ interests to 
have access to such information.  Most merchants would ultimately benefit from ratings 
based on chargeback experience, even if they do not perceive the release of the 
information positively, because most have relatively few complaints.  
What performs the same function as eBay’s ratings in consumer transactions with 
most retailers is trade names and trademarks.  Overloaded with information from 
advertising, and confronted with choices frequently too complex for rational decision -
making within their limited time available, consumers rely on the reputation of the 
retailer to select where to shop, and on brand loyalty to choose products.  As available 
time for consumer decision-making becomes more limited, assuming a similar volume of 
input of relevant information, reliance on brand loyalty increases.212
Regulatory intervention to mandate compilation and release of relevant 
chargeback statistics for merchants that accept payment cards would be in the interests of 
consumers, and would not present an insurmountable cost to issuers, merchant acquirers 
or the card associations.  Chargebacks are already coded according to the reason for 
211 See supra, text at n. 202.
212 Cf. J. Edward Russo, “More Information is Better: A Reevaluation of Jacoby, Speller and Kohn,” 1 J. 
Consumer Res. 68, 71-72 (1974).  Russo took issue with the theory of information overload, but his 
research, showing that confusion decreased with increased data, was predicated on the assumption that the 
subjects took enough time to process the information.  Information is not overload if consumers have 
enough time to process it, but the accelerated pace of life in the 21st century gives consumers less 
processing time.
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reversal of each transaction.213  Codes that simply reflect voluntary exchange or return of 
merchandise, for example, would not be held against a merchant; a merchant that 
behaved properly in making an exchange would not incur negative consequences.  Only 
those codes reflecting culpable conduct by the merchant would be compiled.  Chargeback 
reason codes might have to be revised to clearly distinguish chargebacks that count 
toward a merchant’s rating and chargebacks that are irrelevant to it.  
For example, Visa U.S.A. currently has 24 chargeback reason codes, down from 
44 codes with 59 subcodes that were in use prior to October, 2004.214 One, Visa Reason 
Code 53, Merchandise/Service Not As Described or Defective Merchandise, is defined on 
the Wells Fargo Online Merchant Services website as “[e]ither the customer claims the 
goods or services received did not match the description/picture on your [the merchant’s] 
Web site or other documentation/information they received from you, or the merchandise 
arrived damaged, defective or otherwise unsuitable for the purpose sold. Additionally, 
the customer claims the merchandise was returned, the service was cancelled, or they 
attempted to resolve the dispute with you.”215  MasterCard Reason Code 53 and Discover 
Reason Code RM are similar.216  In all chargeback systems, the merchant is given an 
opportunity to credit the customer’s account or to explain why a credit is inappropriate.  
It is proposed here that if the issuer rejects the merchant’s explanation, or receives 
no explanation, or alternatively if the merchant does not credit the customer’s account 
until the customer has had to complain to the issuer, a chargeback coded as Visa Reason 
Code 53 or its equivalent MasterCard or Discover code would be counted in statistics 
disclosed to the public regarding that merchant by the card association.
Other chargeback reason codes can readily be classified as countable or not 
countable in the statistics, depending on whether they may reflect culpable conduct by the 
merchant.  Thus, for example, codes reflecting that items were illegible, that presentment 
was late or that a card was declined obviously do not reflect on the merchant’s conduct, 
213
 Chase Merchant Services lists the ten most common reasons for chargebacks as follows, with the first 
being the most frequent (see 
www.chase.com/cm/cs?pagename=Chase/Href&urlname=chase/sb/merchantservices/custservice/resolve): 
1. Business fails to respond to a retrieval request [i.e., a request for documentation of a disputed charge] 
(reason codes 01/26/79)
2. Customer was billed more than once for a single transaction (reason codes 25/34/82)
3. Customer denies making or authorizing a transaction (reason codes 23/43/61)
4. Failure of business to follow correct procedures or complete the sales slip at the point-of-sale (reason 
codes 37/39/81/84)
5. Account numbers don't match (reason codes 12/25/77)
6. A credit/refund was not processed properly (reason codes 24/60/85)
7. Failure to obtain proper authorization (reason codes 08/20/72)
8. The card was used either before or after the valid dates (reason codes: 22/23/32/35/58/73 )
9. Merchandise or service not received by cardholder (reason codes 24/55/90).
10. Cardholder disputes quality of merchandise/service (reason codes: 53/54/56).
214
 Visa Rules for Merchants, Section 7; “Chargebacks and Dispute Resolution: Reengineering Disputes,” 
available at 
http://usa.visa.com/business/accepting_visa/ops_risk_management/chargebacks_dispute_resolution/reengin
eering_disputes.html.   Visa’s “RED” (reengineering disputes) project rules went into effect in October 
2004.
215 See http://www.wellsfargosecure.com/customer/chargebacks/3.htm. 
216 Id.
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while codes for “altered amount” or “non-receipt of goods” may well reflect misconduct 
by the merchant or its employees.217
If compilation of, and public access to, chargeback data were mandated by law, a 
consumer interested in buying a washer-dryer could identify merchants carrying the 
desired products, then research the merchants’ respective chargeback records, perhaps by 
visiting a website where the data is posted.  If one merchant has a poor record and the 
other has a good record, consumers would benefit by being able to take those data into 
account in choosing where to shop.  However, it is highly unlikely that this proposal 
would be effectuated through private lawmaking.
In a sense, it is odd that Visa and MasterCard have not chosen to pursue this idea 
in the United States.  Competition to acquire merchants for the network is considerably 
lessened by the ubiquity of payment cards in this country.  A merchant that does not 
accept cards is likely to be very small, and most businesses that accept Visa, also accept 
MasterCard and, for the most part, American Express.218  As debit and prepaid cards gain 
market share in the U.S., there is proportionately greater need for card associations and 
card issuers to compete for consumers and to try to steer them to more lucrative credit 
card use, while there is less need to compete for merchants.  The provision of chargeback 
data could be restricted to consumers who own or use payment cards, increasing 
consumer goodwill.  Indeed, the data could be offered for a fee, with the fee waived for 
consumers who use their cards regularly.
One function that greater transparency in the chargeback system would perform is 
to deter merchant misconduct.  Transparency seems to have had a beneficial effect in 
deterring misconduct by merchants that do regular business on eBay.  eBay maintains 
ratings of online merchants by consumers, and displays the frequency of complaints.219
Merchants are given the opportunity to respond to particular complaints, and their 
responses are also posted.  
Another means of deterring merchant misconduct would be experience rating of 
the discounts that are deducted from what merchants collect from credit and debit card 
issuers.  Currently, discount rates are standardized depending on whether the merchant 
engages in remote transactions, in which the card is not presented by the customer.  Mail 
order-telephone order (“MOTO”) and Internet merchants, now collectively called “card-
not-present” or “MO/TO/EC” merchants,220 are at high risk for unauthorized charges, and 
hence incur a higher discount rate than the roughly 1.6% discount that is deducted from 
what “card-present” merchants receive from card issuers for transactions with customers 
217
 The Wells Fargo Online Merchant Services website includes a convenient list of 18 Visa reason codes, 
18 MasterCard codes and 14 Discover codes, with links to the definition of each.  See 
http://www.wellsfargosecure.com/customer/chargebacks/3.htm.
218
 American Express cards technically are “charge cards” rather than “credit cards,” since the balance due, 
apart from the “Blue” or “Optima” card, must be paid in full each month.
219 See Henry Perritt, “Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of ADR,” 15 Ohio St. J. 
on Disp. Resol. 675, 696 (2000); Victoria C. Crawford, “A Proposal to Use Alternative Dispute Resolution 
as a Foundation to Build an Independent Global Cyberlaw Jurisdiction Using Business to Consumer 
Transactions as a Model,” 25 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 383, 396 (2001) (this author does not mean to 
endorse the notion of an “independent global cyberlaw jurisdiction,” whatever that may be).
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 Visa U.S.A., Card Acceptance and Chargeback Management Guide for Visa Merchants (“Visa Rules for 
Merchants”), Appendix 1, available at 
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using credit and debit cards.
Differentiation of discount rates according to card acceptance procedure will not 
deter merchants from engaging in fraudulent practices or selling shoddy merchandise.  
Currently the only sanction against merchant misconduct is to threaten to terminate a 
merchant’s membership in the card association and access to the card network.  This is 
rarely used, and is not a nuanced approach to the problem.
An alternative would be to set discount rates according to a chargeback 
experience rating system.  Merchants that incur a higher proportion of certain types of 
chargebacks that may indicate misconduct, relative to the total volume of transactions, 
than other merchants would have a higher percentage discounted from what they collect 
from card issuers.  The types of chargebacks that would count in setting discount rates 
would be determined by chargeback reason code.  
Experience rating has been used or considered in many different contexts: 
Workers’ Compensation systems for determining employer premiums for insurance 
against employee injuries;221 medical malpractice insurance;222 disability insurance in the 
Netherlands;223 Unemployment Insurance, and even ticket raffles.224  Banks, too, are 
rated in the United States.  The “CAMELS”225 rating is used by the Federal Reserve, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. to 
determine the extent of supervisory activity and the levels of premiums charged to banks 
for federal deposit insurance.
The problem with using experience rating in setting discount rates for individual 
merchants is that after Wal-Mart, discount rates may be subject to negotiation based on 
considerations that may have little to do with chargeback experience.  Even if Wal-Mart 
had a higher percentage of chargebacks than other merchants, its high volume of payment 
card business strengthens its hand in negotiating a lower discount rate.  In contrast, small 
merchants are likely to be charged a higher discount rate despite favorable chargeback 
experience.  Public disclosure of merchants with adverse chargeback experience would 
be more effective, and would not necessitate a retreat from negotiated discount rates.
2. Grounds for Reversal of Transactions
In most countries that have adopted regulatory regimes for payment cards, 
provisions have been made for the correction of billing errors.  Card association 
chargeback rules permit chargebacks in cases of billing error.  However, only in North 
America and a few European countries are consumers permitted to initiate chargebacks 
based on contract disputes between consumer and merchant, such as non-conformity of 
221 See Edwin R. Teple and Charles G. Nowacek, “Experience Rating: Its Objectives, Problems and 
Economic Implications,” 8 Vand. L. Rev. 376 (1954); Almon R. Arnold, “Experience Rating,” 55 Yale L. 
J. 218 (1945); 
222
 Note: The Applicability of Experience Rating to Medical Malpractice Insurance, 38 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 255 (1987).
223
 Pierre Koning, “Estimating the impact of experience rating on the inflow into disability insurance in the 
Netherlands,” CPB Discussion Paper No. 37, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, 
August 2004.
224
 “Experience Rating: Applying traditional fund-raising techniques to Ticket Raffles,” available at 
www.vansys.com/research/experience_rating_1.html. 
225
 CAMELS is an acronym for capital, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to 
interest-rate risk.
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the goods with the contract, non-delivery or delayed delivery of goods, and defective 
goods.  In addition, bank statement rules – rules regarding the time and procedure for 
giving notice of billing errors, and the effect of failure to do so – differ from country to 
country.
One key issue regarding reversibility of debit and prepaid card transactions is 
whether consumers should be entitled to reversal of transactions based on claims and 
defenses arising out of the underlying contract between consumer and merchant.  Prior to 
1974, when TILA §170226 was enacted, it was a subject of considerable debate in the 
United States whether credit card issuers should be regarded as if they were holders in 
due course (“HDC’s”), like finance companies that financed consumer purchases of 
automobiles, washing machines or other consumer goods based on a negotiable note or 
chattel paper.  If card issuers were HDC’s, they would have the right to recover from the 
cardholder regardless of most types of defenses or claims in recoupment, such as breach 
of warranty or fraud.227
A consumer who purchased a car or a washing machine that was a “lemon” 
normally would have to pay the finance company that financed the purchase due to its 
HDC status, and would be left with a claim against the merchant that sold her the 
machine.  Exceptions were made for lenders that purchased the note or chattel paper with 
notice of a defense or claim, so-called “real” defenses such as illegality, incapacity, 
bankruptcy discharge, and “fraud in factum,” and cases in which the lender was so related 
to the merchant as to have constructive notice of consumer claims or defenses.  It was 
much debated in American law reviews whether charge slips on a credit card account 
would be regarded as the equivalent of negotiable chattel paper or promissory notes, or 
whether instead, consumer claims and defenses should be preserved.228
The debate of the early 1970’s over preservation of consumer claims and defenses 
in payment card transactions was resolved in favor of the consumer with the enactment of 
TILA §170.229  That section, in the nature of an anti-holder in due course rule, preserves 
against the issuer any claims a consumer has against the merchant such as breach of 
warranty, or defenses against the merchant’s right to payment for goods and services, if 
(a) the consumer first made a good faith attempt to resolve the dispute, (b) the transaction 
occurred within the same state as, or within 100 miles of, the consumer’s mailing 
226
 15 U.S.C. §1666i.
227 See UCC §3-305.
228 See, e.g., Brandel & Leonard, supra, at 1064ff. (suggesting a geographic limit within which defenses 
would be preserved); Neil O. Littlefield, “Preservation of Consumer Defenses in Interlocking Loans and 
Credit Card Transactions – Recent Statutes, Policies and a Proposal,” 1973 Wis. L. Rev. 471 (1973); Note: 
Preserving Consumer Defenses in Credit Card Transactions, 81 Yale L. J. 287 (1971); Note: Direct Loan 
Financing of Consumer Purchases, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1409 (1972); Robert J. Banta, “Negotiability in 
Consumer Sales: the Need for Further Study,” 53 Neb. L. Rev. 195, 196 (1974) (“Preservation of consumer 
defenses has been and continues to be one of the most hotly debated issues in the consumer credit 
industry.”); Alan Schwartz, “Optimality and the Cutoff of Defenses Against Financers of Consumer Sales,” 
15 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 499 (1974); Benjamin Geva, “Optimality and Preservation of Consumer 
Defenses – a Model for Reform,” 31 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 51, 70-73 (1980).
229
 The debate went on for two more years regarding whether a holder of a consumer credit contract for the 
purchase of goods or services should be subject to the same claims and defenses as the merchant, until, in 
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address, and (c) the chargeback does not exceed the account balance when the consumer 
first notifies the card issuer of the claim or defense.  Whether a remote transaction over 
the Internet or telephone occurred within the geographic limit is a question that has 
received inconsistent answers from the American courts.230
No equivalent provision regarding preservation of claims and defenses exists in 
the Electronic Fund Transfer Act with respect to debit card transactions, and none exists 
regarding purchases with prepaid cards.  Thus, authorized debit and prepaid card 
transactions are final, as if they were cash transactions.231
Several non-U.S. jurisdictions have enacted laws enabling consumers to assert 
against card issuers defenses or claims they have against merchants, other than duplicate 
or erroneous entries and unauthorized transactions.  These countries include Finland, 
Greece, Israel, Japan, Korea, Norway and the UK.232  However, with the exception of 
Israel, 233 these countries’ laws universally draw a distinction between credit and debit 
card holders, affording credit card holders the right to assert defenses and claims against 
the issuer but not debit card holders.
In the 1970’s debate over preservation of claims and defenses, the banking 
industry asserted that it was unfair to place liability on the issuer for merchant 
misconduct, and that because the issuer is not able to limit its risk on debit cards by 
placing a ceiling on the amount that can be withdrawn, the issuer’s risk is potentially 
unlimited.  On the other hand, consumer groups and a number of legal scholars raised 
two counterarguments: (1) banks are in a position to “police” merchants that engage in 
frequent misconduct and to prevent them from having access to the card network;234 and 
(2) banks are in a better position to allocate risks through chargebacks and to pass on 
losses through the discount rates imposed on merchants and in the case of credit cards, 
through interest rates charged to consumers.235
Since the early 1980’s, excluding Professor Mann’s recent article,236 little has 
been written on the subject of preservation of consumer claims and defenses against card 
issuers, yet in countries that have yet to adopt consumer protection regimes, this is an 
issue that should be decided.  Since the early 1980’s, too, changes in conditions have 
strengthened some of the policy arguments on the subject of preservation of claims and 
defenses and weakened others.  When EFTA was enacted in 1978, bankers were 
concerned that consumer protection laws might restrain the growth of the debit card 
networks or deter consumers from using the system.237  The opposite occurred; the 
networks grew more because consumers had greater confidence.238
Instead, it is now the odd merchant in the United States that refuses to accept any 
230 Compare Plutchok v. European American Bank, 143 Misc.2d 149, 540 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1989) and In re 
Standard Financial Management, 94 B.R. 231, 239 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988).
231
 EFTA §908(f), 15 U.S.C. §1693(f),  lists types of “errors” that are subject to required error resolution 
procedures.  These are limited to unauthorized and incorrect entries on bank statements and to receipt of an 
incorrect sum of money from an ATM.
232
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kind of payment cards in face-to-face transactions.239 The same is true in Japan, parts of 
Europe and the UK.  Moreover, the merchant acquirer business – the banks that acquire 
merchants for the network and handle their accounts – has developed into a highly 
concentrated specialty in banking in which a small number of large banks and card data 
processors handle vast numbers of merchant accounts, all of which are linked to and 
contractually bound by the chargeback system.240  Additionally, in the United States, at 
least, many bank debit card networks are linked to each other, further linking merchants 
and banks regardless of which network they are on.  
At the same time, due to the massively greater number of merchants that are part 
of the payment card networks, “policing” merchants is no small job.  The idea that card 
issuers should be responsible for policing merchants within a limited geographic area, 
that was incorporated into the Truth-in-Lending Act provisions on preservation of claims 
and defenses,241 now seems quaintly archaic, as the Internet has made geography almost 
irrelevant.
The argument raised by the banking industry that a bank’s liability on a debit card 
transaction would be limited only by the amount in the card holder’s bank account also 
seems dated, and made little sense to begin with.  Credit card limits are commonly higher 
than the cardholder’s bank account balance.  Also, with merchants overwhelmingly being 
linked to the chargeback system in the United States, it is unusual – though certainly not 
unheard of242 – for a bank to be left without recourse to the merchant’s account when a 
chargeback is found to be justified.  However, the bank’s exposure is dependent on the 
merchant’s solvency, not the solvency of the consumer, and merchant acquirers are 
capable of screening out those merchants whose solvency is questionable.
In countries in which networks are just being established and in which merchants 
may be reluctant to participate in the system and may be at greater risk of insolvency than 
typical merchants in the United States, the arguments against preservation of consumer 
claims and defenses have greater force.  However, at the same time, the vast growth in 
debit cards suggests that merchants even in those countries will prefer to participate in 
payment card networks to remain competitive.   Consumers, meanwhile, will use debit 
cards more frequently if they have recourse to the chargeback system in case of problems 
with the merchants with which they deal.  As remote transactions grow with 
improvements in telecommunications, consumer confidence is at a premium.
239
“Technology has significantly changed consumers' payment options, with the credit card becoming an 
accepted payment medium for virtually any consumer good or service.”  Testimony of Federal Reserve 
Board Gov. Edward M. Gramlich before the U.S. Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, 
May 17, 2005, available at 
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240 See http://www.greensheet.com/PriorIssues-/030701-/6.htm.  According to the Nilson Report, the five
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B. Problems of Loss Allocation
1. Fraudulent and Unauthorized Transactions
In the United States, the consumer problem of greatest concern in payment 
systems – indeed, the problem of greatest concern overall - is fraudulent transactions, and 
particularly identity theft.  39% of consumer complaints to the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission in 2003 were for identity theft, and U.S. consumers rate it as their highest 
priority among consumer issues, although the incidence of identity theft in credit cards 
actually has begun to level off.243  On the other hand, debit card fraud in the U.S. is 
growing rapidly.244  Debit card fraud is already at high levels in Canada.245
The high level of fraud in Canada occurs despite the fact that Canadian debit 
cards are entirely PIN (online) debit.  The linkage of all ATM’s to a single network, 
Interac, in Canada and more frequent use of debit cards there are related causes.  By 
comparison, in the United States there are 25 different networks.246  On the other hand, 
signature debit, unique to the United States, with a two- to three-day delay in clearance 
and settlement, entails greater risk of loss due to non-payment in cases of insufficient 
funds and closed bank accounts.
The problems of debit card users are similar to those of users of credit cards and 
checks, particularly with respect to the allocation of loss due to unauthorized use, identity 
theft and fraud.  However, laws in many countries establish divergent rules and standards 
for debit card users and the users of credit cards, checks and cash.
If a consumer in the United States loses a blank check on the bus, and a thief 
forges the consumer’s signature, the loss normally falls on the payor bank absent fault on 
the part of the consumer, but if the loss of the check was caused by the consumer’s 
negligence, the consumer bears at least part of the loss on comparative fault principles.247
However, if the same consumer lost a credit card along with the check, and the 
same thief used the credit card to make a purchase, the consumer’s liability would be 
limited by law to a maximum of $50, regardless of the amount of the purchase, regardless 
of the consumer’s negligence in losing the card, and regardless of the consumer’s further 
243
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negligence in failing to review credit card statements.248  In the case of a credit card, the 
loss ultimately would fall on the merchant, barring the merchant’s insolvency, assuming 
that the card issuer pursued its right of chargeback under association (Visa or 
MasterCard) rules.
Legal scholars have rationalized the $50 “small-dollar exclusion” as an attempt to 
achieve optimal efficiency of the system by placing the obligation on the party who can 
avoid the loss at the lowest cost.249 Professor Mann continues to argue for the small-
dollar exclusion on the ground that in small transactions “claims to reverse payment 
would more commonly be abusive than in the context of more significant purchases, if 
only because it is difficult to imagine a legitimate basis for reversing payment in that 
context.”250  This argument is incoherent. There is no logical reason why small-dollar 
transactions would be more prone to abusive claims by consumers than large-dollar 
transactions; in fact, the cost in terms of time and effort necessary to make a claim for 
reversal of payment and the risk of being found out if the claim is abusive would likely 
deter scoundrels from making fraudulent claims unless the dollar amount made it 
worthwhile to do so.  
The $50 ceiling was originally put forth in a seminal article in the Michigan Law 
Review in 1971 as an “arbitrary” figure selected as a boundary between small purchases 
in which credit cards normally would be used for convenience as a cash substitute, and 
larger purchases which a consumer normally might expect to carry as a revolving credit 
balance.251 The $50 ceiling was translated into a £50 ceiling in UK law, in §84 of the 
Consumer Credit Act adopted in 1974.252  Again, however, transfers from deposit 
accounts were excluded.  Section 84 was said to be an exception to the general rule of 
§83 of the Consumer Credit Act that a debtor under a regulated consumer credit 
agreement is not liable for loss “arising from use of the credit facility by another 
person….”  
In the case of debit cards, American law attempts to have it both ways.  The 
consumer’s liability for unauthorized debit card transactions is limited to $50 – but only 
if he or she reports the loss to the issuer within two business days after discovery.253  For 
the consumer who fails to report promptly, the ceiling is raised to $500 for charges 
beyond the two business days, and to unlimited liability for charges on the lost card once 
a consumer has had 60 days to review a credit card statement reflecting unauthorized 
charges and still has failed to report the loss.254  The consumer’s duty is to be a prompt 
reporter and careful reader of statements from her bank, but not (apart from the now-
minor risk of a $50 liability, which may be waived by the issuer) to prevent the loss or 
theft of the card.  The merchant’s duty is left entirely up to contract with the merchant’s 
bank and to association rule.
Other countries have taken a variety of approaches to the consumer’s liability for 
unauthorized debit card transactions.  In some, a negligence standard applies, and in 
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others, a combination of rules and standards is applied.  For example, in Australia, under 
codes of practice adopted by the banking industry and enforced through the Australian 
Banking Ombudsman, a cardholder is absolved of liability beyond Aus$50 for 
unauthorized transactions occurring before notification of the issuer that a card has been 
lost or stolen, provided that the cardholder was neither negligent nor contributory to the 
loss of the card.255
The European Commission issued a recommendation in 1997 on the subject of 
electronic payment instruments which applies to debit cards.256  The REP recommended 
that member states adopt a liability ceiling for the holder in case of loss or theft of the 
card for unauthorized transactions prior to the holder’s reporting the loss or theft to the 
issuer, “except where he acted with extreme negligence or fraudulently.”  The REP 
included a recommendation that in case of a dispute, the issuer should have the burden of 
proving that a transaction was accurately recorded and entered into accounts.257
However, only two member states of the EU had adopted laws following that 
recommendation as of 2002.258  A proposed EC Payments Directive would establish a 
ceiling of 150 euros for a consumer’s liability for unauthorized use of any payment card, 
credit or debit.
In 1968 when the Truth-in-Lending Act was originally enacted in the United 
States, credit cards were seen as an instrument not of access to cash, but access to 
credit,259 and therefore the Act was drafted on the assumption that credit cardholders 
must be treated as borrowers.  A purported borrower is not ordinarily liable to repay a 
loan that he or she did not authorize and from which he or she did not benefit. Something 
more serious than presentation of a plastic card to the merchant is necessary to commit 
the borrower to a loan, and even failure to report the loss of the card is insufficient to 
ratify the unauthorized loan transaction.
Debit cards, on the other hand, confer access to cash.  The liability ceiling for 
unauthorized use of a debit card in EFTA was a compromise, the outcome of a battle 
between advocates of a negligence standard, including the banking industry, and 
consumer advocates who advocated the same $50 ceiling that applied to credit cards.260
Consumer advocates argued that the $50 ceiling was adequate incentive to consumers to 
exercise sufficient care with respect to their cards, and that making the issuer liable for 
losses over $50, it would have sufficient incentive to implement security measures to
minimize its losses.261  Banks, on the other hand, argued that unlike credit cards, which 
have a fixed credit limit, debit card losses depended entirely on the amount of money the 
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consumer had in his bank account.262  However, at that time debit cards were only usable 
to access ATM’s, which have dollar limits for cash withdrawals.
Compare these rules to the rules pertaining to cash.  Under American law, a
consumer has no recourse with respect to stolen cash, except to sue for conversion if he 
or she can identify the perpetrator.  A merchant who receives payment in lost or stolen 
cash has no duty to the consumer who owns the cash, even if the circumstances of 
payment were such as should have reasonably prompted suspicion.  The reason for this 
misallocation of loss is primarily the anonymity of cash, and secondarily the cost of time.  
If cash were identified by owner – e.g., if a dollar bill had an electronic tag stating in 
bright neon letters who owned it at any given moment – then would the merchant, 
receiving tagged cash from the thief, still be held to no duty with respect to the identified 
owner of the cash?   Possibly not, but only if the legislature considered the transactions 
costs in terms of time that would be incurred by the merchant in examining the bills and 
asking for identification to be too significant.
For purposes deemed sufficiently important and amounts sufficiently significant, 
the legislature has imposed duties on the recipient of cash.  For example, money 
laundering rules adopted pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act263 require banks to file 
Currency Transaction Reports for cash transactions of $10,000 or more.264 Cash 
transactions of $5,000 or more under suspicious circumstances require the filing of 
Suspicious Activity Reports.265
American consumer law thus incorporates divergent rules and standards of loss 
allocation for four instrumentalities of payment, all of which are usually used by 
consumers as cash or cash equivalents.  
This divergence has drawn the attention of legal scholars.  In 1996, Professor 
Clayton P. Gillette criticized Cooter and Rubin, supra, on the theory that an attempt to 
achieve optimal efficiency could not adequately explain the choices of legislatures to 
treat loss allocation rules for checks and payment cards differently.  “It is curious,” he 
wrote, “that the [American] law concerning fraud in payment systems varies among 
payment devices.”266  He assumed that “in designing payment rules, the legislature was 
seeking to allocate risks optimally,”267 but concluded that the “difficult issues of 
classification” posed by regulated activities, for example, that are “susceptible to 
significant variance in precautions or losses” and externalities such as politics and 
historical accident can result in sub-optimal levels of precision in legislation and motivate 
courts to intervene by creating exceptions or treating rules as guidelines.268  He further 
pointed out that in payment systems regulation, the identification of superior risk-bearers 
may be incapable of being done cost-effectively except through generalizations or the use 
of surrogates.269
The Visa and MasterCard associations ultimately decided to waive the $50 in all 
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cases.270 Presumably the transaction costs and loss of goodwill incurred by card issuers in 
collecting the $50 from card holders who had been the victims of loss or theft proved to 
be more costly than the amounts collected. 
This action by Visa and MasterCard speaks eloquently to the folly of attempting 
to infer in rules and standards adopted at different times under different political 
conditions precise legislative judgments about optimal loss allocation.  $50 was picked as 
an “arbitrary figure” to establish a boundary between transactions intended by the credit 
cardholder as convenience transactions and transactions intended as credit transactions, 
not as an attempt to optimize anything.271 This “arbitrary figure” was established on the 
theory that up to that amount the lost or stolen card would have been used as a 
“convenience card” in place of cash, so that the loss should be treated as if cash had been 
lost.  The differences in the liability ceilings for debit and credit cards reflected a political 
compromise between those who wanted to treat credit cards and debit cards the same, and 
those dissatisfied with the low credit card liability ceiling who wanted to import a fault 
concept into the rule.272  With credit cards increasingly being used as convenience cards 
even in the United States,273 and the functional differences between debit and credit cards 
correspondingly being diminished, the rationale for the small-dollar exclusion is further 
weakened.
Once the consumer charges back an unauthorized debit card transaction to the 
issuer, as between the issuer and the merchant, which party bears the loss?  In this regard, 
the loss allocation in debit card transactions is different from credit cards.  Card 
association rules generally allocate the loss to the issuer, on the theory that the issuer is 
better situated to adopt security measures than the merchant. 274  Unlike credit card 
transactions, the consumer using a PIN debit card may remain anonymous to the 
merchant as long as the consumer possesses the correct PIN.
Imposing liability on the consumer for unauthorized debit card transactions in 
most cases makes no sense.  In general, the loss of cash is final only because cash can be 
spent anonymously, not the case with cards that are used at the point of sale.275 In 1972, 
in a Note in the Harvard Law Review written when credit cards were the only payment 
cards in the marketplace, the author wrote:
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It is contended that bank cards are predominantly used as convenience 
cards and that consumers tend to pay for their purchases as they are billed 
for them rather than on an installment basis.  [Footnote omitted.]  But for 
the purposes of furthering the two goals which were posited in section II 
[reducing seller misconduct and internalizing seller misconduct costs], any 
similarity between credit card purchases and cash sales is irrelevant.  The 
costs of seller misconduct in cash sales fall on the buyer by necessity 
rather than by design.  Indeed, if a convenient device were available in 
cash sales to shift these costs to a third party who was in a better position 
to minimize the cost of seller misconduct and to reflect the remaining 
costs in the explicit price of goods, it would be desirable to do so.  The 
fact that such a mechanism is infeasible in actual cash sales, therefore, 
does not support its exclusion in other transactions, no matter how 
similar.276
In other words, the physical limitations of cash itself result in a misallocation of 
the costs of merchant misconduct and encourage such misconduct.  Currency and coin, 
once received by a merchant, cannot be charged back to that merchant by a consumer if 
the merchant is engaged in fraud or does not agree to the return of defective merchandise, 
for example, while electronic payments can. It is strange yet true to regard even the 
simplest face-to-face cash transaction as containing the seed of market failure.
The use of payment cards makes it feasible in most cases to correct this 
misallocation through the intervention of the financial institutions that operate the 
payment system.  Those institutions are capable of protecting themselves through security 
procedures.  Since most debit cards do, or should, require use of a PIN, allocation of loss 
to the consumer should be limited to cases in which the PIN is negligently or culpably 
divulged by the consumer to the wrongdoer or in which the consumer’s negligent or 
culpable conduct otherwise compromises a security system implemented by the issuer to 
protect against unauthorized use of the card.277 If American banks want to promote 
signature debit because the interchange fees are higher, they, and not the consumer or 
merchant, should bear the losses that could have been prevented by the use of a PIN.
2. Inconsistency in Loss Allocation Rules
Several countries have adopted statutory rules on consumer protection of debit 
and credit cardholders.278  In many respects they treat credit and debit cardholders the 
same.  However, there are two principal differences:
1.  Rules regarding liability of the cardholder for unauthorized use of the card are 
different in most countries, with debit cardholders bearing greater risk than credit 
276 Note: Direct Loan Financing of Consumer Purchases, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1421 (1972).
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cardholders.279
2. The claims and defenses the cardholder has based on breach of the contract by 
the merchant, e.g., by supplying defective or non-conforming goods, may be asserted 
against the bank that issued the card (the “issuer”) by a credit cardholder but not by a 
debit cardholder.
Prepaid cards are generally treated as equivalent to cash with respect to loss 
allocation; thus, if an employee paid on a payroll card loses the card, the employee may 
have no recourse, and chargeback rules applicable to credit cards do not apply. 280
However, the U.S. Federal Reserve has recently issued a proposed rulemaking that would 
extend Regulation E coverage to certain payroll card accounts.  The proposed rule would 
extend to the holders of payroll cards the same disclosure and error resolution procedures 
and limitations of liability for unauthorized use that currently cover the holders of debit 
cards.281
Outside North America, the UK, Western Europe and the EU, Australia, Israel
and a handful of East Asian countries, laws specifically addressing consumer protection 
with respect to payment cards generally do not yet exist.  Thus, in China, Russia, Brazil 
and other emerging economies in which debit cards are spreading rapidly the consumer’s 
liability would be determined based on general standards and on rules of contract law.  
In the United States, where credit cards continue to predominate over debit cards 
and most consumers own both kinds of cards, these forms of discrimination against debit 
cardholders in favor of credit cardholders have not, to date, been controversial, Professor 
Mann’s recent article notwithstanding.282  However, in countries such as China and 
Russia where relatively few people own credit cards while many millions own and use 
debit cards, drawing distinctions between them adverse to debit cardholders would have a 
number of disadvantages in public policy.
First, as Professor Mann has argued,283 there is not a clear rationale for 
distinguishing between credit and debit cards on functional grounds.  “[T]hese payment 
devices serve similar functions.  Checks and ATM cards are equivalents for the purpose 
of gaining access to the customer’s account at the bank, and checks and credit cards are 
equivalents for the purpose of incurring obligations to pay third-party providers of goods 
279
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and services.  Efforts to allocate the risk of loss for use of these payment devices also 
would appear to share the same objectives…to allocate losses in a manner that induces 
each party involved in a payment transaction to take cost-effective precautions against 
loss.”284  The functions of credit and debit cards are even more similar in societies like 
Japan where credit cards are used primarily for convenience rather than revolving credit, 
and as convenience use increases as a proportion of total credit card charges in the United 
States,285 arguments for treating American debit cardholders like users of cash rather than 
like credit cardholders become weaker.
Second, issues of equity would be raised by laws or policies that discriminate
against debit cardholders in societies in which credit cards are limited to a small
economic elite capable of qualifying for them.  While in the United States the differences 
between consumers’ rights under TILA and EFTA can be attributed to perceived 
functional differences between credit and debit cards, in countries where a few 
businessmen and politicians who are able to purchase with credit cards can return shoddy 
merchandise and obtain a refund while ordinary customers who use debit cards or cash 
cannot, the public is likely to perceive this difference as an assertion of class privilege.
Third, because of the presumable socioeconomic differences between credit and 
debit cardholders, it is likely that debit and prepaid card users in most countries will be 
less sophisticated consumers than credit cardholders and therefore more in need of access 
to means of recourse in cases of fraud, seller misconduct, and breach of contract.  Indeed, 
it could also be asserted that consumers using stored value cards should be accorded such 
rights, as they are often likely to be the “unbanked” and least sophisticated among 
payment card users; however, some stored value cards share with cash the problem of 
anonymity and the risk of fraudulent claims.
Fourth, there may be economic justifications for disparate treatment of debit and 
credit cards.  On this point, Prof. Mann observes:
One obvious concern is that the extension of the reversibility rule to the 
debit card context will increase the costs of debit cards to those that use 
them. If so, the reform might alter the relative desirability of the products 
in significant ways. From one perspective, that is not a reason for concern. 
The only reason that it might alter the costs significantly is if there is a 
significant volume of chargeback activity, which suggests that there are a 
significant number of transactions in which consumers currently lack 
effective recourse. On the other hand, as discussed above, there is the 
empirical possibility that a significant level of chargebacks might reflect 
abusive consumer conduct rather than dishonest merchant conduct. For the 
reasons discussed above, however, I think it unlikely that there will be a 
sufficiently large volume of chargebacks to affect pricing significantly, 
largely because the volume of payment-reversing charge-backs in the 
credit-card system now is quite small.286
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D. Behavioral Issues in Disclosure of Card Fees
Most countries that regulate payment cards impose a disclosure regime on credit 
card issuers, requiring disclosure of various terms and conditions of the accounts.  In the 
United States, TILA and Federal Reserve Regulation Z require elaborate and lengthy 
disclosures of the terms and conditions of credit card accounts to which consumers 
typically pay little attention, apart from a few key terms such as the annual percentage 
rate.  Separate disclosures must be furnished to the cardholder in credit card applications 
and solicitations, at the time of establishing the account, in the cardholder’s periodic 
statements, and on an annual basis.287  Model forms for applications and solicitations 
included in an appendix to Regulation Z contain key credit terms in tabular form, 
followed by more voluminous detailed disclosures.288
The disclosures required for debit cards in the United States under EFTA and 
Federal Reserve Regulation E289 are somewhat less voluminous,290 and model forms are 
limited to the text of clauses and notices.291
Disclosure requirements as consumer protection policy must be evaluated in light 
of behavioral studies suggesting that disclosure, without more, is ineffective in affecting 
consumer choice.292 The 1970’s debate over simplification of Truth-in-Lending Act 
requirements that resulted in the Truth-in-Lending Simplification Act of 1980 was 
centered on cognitive psychology and the theory of information overload.  The theory of 
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information overload posits that if too much information is disclosed to consumers, they 
are easily confused, are unable to use the information and do not make better decisions as 
a result.293
One solution, adopted in some of the TILA model forms published by the Federal 
Reserve Board, advocated by consumer groups in the U.S. and the U.K., 294 and 
sometimes called the “Honesty Box” or the “Schumer Box” after Sen. Charles Schumer
(D-NY), is “layered” disclosure that highlights a few key terms, e.g., in boldface type in a 
box, while more voluminous disclosures are set forth in fine print elsewhere on the 
document.  There is no reason why layered disclosure should be used only in certain 
forms under TILA and not in debit card disclosures that are subject instead to EFTA.
If layered disclosure is to be used for debit cards, what terms should be “in the 
box”?  The annual percentage rate and other terms disclosed “in the box” for credit cards 
are inapplicable to debit cards.  
However, exorbitant and undisclosed fees for debit and prepaid card transactions 
remain a problem for consumers, and affect access for consumers who typically remit 
small amounts of money.  In the United States, a significant percentage of prepaid cards 
include per-transaction POS fees.295 Moreover, although payroll cards may be usable at 
ATM’s, fees for such use are unregulated and are commonly imposed,296 apparently on 
the theory that payroll cardholders are not considered bank customers because the 
employer, not the cardholder, funds the account. Debit card fees may be imposed not 
only by banks, but often by merchants that accept PIN-based debit cards.  Consumers 
who use debit cards at a point of sale in the United States often cannot be sure whether 
they will be charged no fees, one fee by their bank, or two fees, one by their bank and one 
by the merchant.
Moreover, the recent global proliferation of debit cards has made it easier for 
consumers to overdraw their bank accounts.  In some countries, such as Russia, banks 
have been quick to grant small, fee-laden overdraft credit lines along with debit cards, so 
that consumers who use their new debit cards to overdraw their bank accounts pay heavy 
charges and interest.  Elsewhere, as in China, banks have also issued secured credit cards 
to their customers, and established stiff penalties and interest for overdrafts.
Fees imposed on consumers for debit card use are often arbitrary.  For example, 
ATM users are typically charged a fee for withdrawing cash from ATM’s in Germany but 
not in France, where ATM use is free.297 An EC study in 1999 found that member state 
debit card users who made purchases in other member states were charged no fee if the 
card was issued in Belgium, Ireland, Spain, Luxembourg or Finland, but were charged 
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fees by issuing banks in other countries, with German banks charging the most.298
However, under EU Regulation 2560/2001, since July 2003 banks have been 
required to charge the same for small euro cross-border payments as for domestic 
payments.  The effect is that, at least in theory, a French bank’s customer armed with a 
French debit card could withdraw cash from a German ATM without paying a fee – if the 
German ATM operator charges a fee, the French bank is supposed to bear it, not the 
customer - while the same person using a German debit card would have to pay a fee for 
withdrawing the same cash from the same ATM.299
In the U.S., local governmental attempts to regulate abusive ATM surcharges by 
federally-chartered banks have been frustrated by federal preemption.300 The same has 
been true of judicial attempts to use “Little FTC Acts” and other state laws on unfair 
trade practices to strike down other bank fees, such as overdraft fees.301 A recent ruling 
of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency held that the application of most state 
regulatory statutes to national banks is preempted by federal law.302 In contrast, the EU 
has taken an approach more favorable to substantive regulation of fees and charges, under 
the authority of its Unfair Contract Terms Directive.303
Layered disclosure of debit and prepaid card fees should be required by issuers, so 
that consumers will be likely to pay attention to the disclosures.  Merchants that charge 
fees for use of debit and prepaid cards should be required to disclose these fees in a 
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meaningful fashion.  Disclosure when one’s goods have already been rung up at the cash 
register is not meaningful; consumers are already psychologically committed to the 
transaction by that time.  Rather, disclosure should be made on entry to the store, or on 
approaching the cash register, and in a manner calculated to catch one’s attention.
Even layered disclosure, however, is likely to be insufficient protection for 
consumers against behavioral manipulation.  For example, consumers display behavioral 
biases that result in the underestimation of future borrowing, and an undue optimism that 
credit card balances can be paid currently, making interest rates seem unimportant.304  No 
amount of disclosure is likely to curb that optimism.  Moreover, the subject-matter of 
disclosures lends itself to manipulation, viz. the meaninglessness of disclosure of annual 
percentage rates of variable loans that are based on initial promotional rates.  
Payment card fees charged by issuers are a good example of manipulable subject-
matter, because they are a morass of cross-subsidization.  Late- and over-limit fees and 
interest rates for credit cards are set well above marginal cost, while annual and per-
transaction fees are set below marginal cost and usually, in the U.S., are non-existent.305
Bank issuers of credit cards effectively defray transaction processing costs by increased 
spreads between interest rates and their cost of funds, and by imposing late- and over-
limit fees.  In the U.S., point-of-sale (“POS”) fees and fees for use of other banks’ ATM’s 
have historically been common for PIN debit though POS fees have been cut back post-
Wal-Mart.  
In parts of Europe, however, such as Finland and Belgium, POS fees are 
uncommon.  Do Finnish and Belgian banks subsidize processing costs, and if so, what 
charges do they impose on other services to offset this subsidy?  Are banks in the U.S. 
charging above marginal cost and making a profit on POS fees that goes to subsidize 
credit card use, on which issuers earn high rates of interest? Most importantly, how can a 
consumer know the true cost of using a payment card when certain fees subsidize other 
fees?  These questions require further study, but they illustrate the difficulty of 
formulating disclosure requirements that will be meaningful to consumers.
E. Problems of Access to Banking Services
Debit cards, unlike prepaid cards, require a bank account.  This fact places a 
premium on the right to open a bank account.  Banks may turn away customers they 
deem undesirable due to adverse credit history, immigration status or other reasons.  It 
appears to be uncommon in the United States for customers to be denied the right to open 
a bank account, but not so in Europe.  During 2004, Belgium enacted legislation 
guaranteeing all consumers the right to access to bank services.  Other EU countries have 
enacted or considered enacting similar legislation.  
Outside Western Europe and Scandinavia, however, laws of this kind are virtually 
non-existent.  Although American law prohibits discrimination on the basis of certain 
invidious categories such as race and gender, there is no general right to a bank account 
in the United States, and nothing prevents banks from turning away customers who want 
to open a deposit account on grounds related to poverty, for example, that they have a 
past bankruptcy or foreclosure on their credit record, or have been evicted from their 
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residence, or lack a permanent address.
In several countries, lack of physical access to banking services has been a 
prominent consumer issue, particularly the lack of branch banks in rural areas.  In 
addition to promising technological solutions like m-banking, one creative attempt to 
provide geographic access is Banco Postal in Brazil, a joint venture between a major 
bank, Bradesco, and the Brazilian Postal and Telegraph Co. (Correios) to place branches 
in post offices in areas that previously lacked financial services.306  The post office banks 
have brought over 1.5 million previously “unbanked” people in Brazil into the banking 
system.
As discussed above, password-protected prepaid cards are another solution to the 
problem of the “unbanked.”  Stored value cards present money- laundering issues that are 
beyond the scope of this article but might limit the enthusiasm of law enforcement 
authorities for them as a solution.  As the amount of value stored on cards grows, they 
also could pose economic issues regarding regulation of the money supply.  The trend in 
the developed economies is toward stored value cards, particularly phone cards, being 
used for mobile micro payments to vendors of goods and services apart from their use to 
pay for telephone calls.307 Stored value cards also are usable at ATM’s to obtain cash.
However, in emerging economies such as Russia, and to some extent in the U.S., 
stored value payroll cards, such as those now offered by Visa U.S.A., are becoming 
common.  If one’s entire salary is paid by loading value onto a stored value card, it is 
likely that one will use the card for more than just micropayments or ATM transactions.
As payroll cards solve problems of access to banking services, and as merchants 
in the developing world acquire the necessary equipment to accept them in payment, the 
number of large-amount stored value card payment transactions can be expected to 
increase significantly.  Also, with so much value stored on cards, problems of security 
and the risk of unauthorized transactions are magnified. Though payroll cards are usually 
password-protected, such protection has not always prevented fraudulent transactions, 
e.g., in Canada where sophisticated schemes have resulted in a high rate of theft and 
misuse of passwords for PIN debit cards.
F. Discharge of Obligations in Debit and Prepaid Card Transactions: 
the Insolvency Problem
Because most debit and prepaid card transactions, other than signature debit, clear 
in real time, discharge of obligations in debit and prepaid card consumer transactions is 
usually not an issue, except in the case of “signature” debit transactions where there is a 
delay before the merchant receives payment.  Misdirected payments are not usually a 
problem because magnetic strip and chip technology on cards and the technology of card-
reading equipment have made them unusual.  In contrast, UCC Article 4A, applicable to 
wire transfers through commercial wire transfer systems such as the Federal Reserve’s 
FedWire system, devotes several sections to problems of discharge and misdirected 
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payments;308 wire transfers are more susceptible to error due to manual entry of payment 
instructions such as the beneficiary/payee’s account number.
Discharge rules can become an issue in case of insolvency, either the insolvency 
of financial institutions, payment service companies such as PayPal that maintain 
consumer accounts, or transaction processors such as First Data Corp. that process card 
transactions on behalf of financial institutions.  Discharge also can be problematic in case 
of the insolvency of the payor or the merchant.
Financial institution insolvency continues to be a problem for consumers in Africa 
and elsewhere in the developing world.   In the mid-1990’s nine banks in Zambia, 
representing over 23% of total commercial bank assets, failed.309  At roughly the same 
time Nigeria witnessed the failure of seventeen local banks, while Kenya and Uganda 
also experienced the failure of several local banks that represented significant 
percentages of commercial bank assets in those countries.310  A large number of these 
banks, particularly in Kenya and Nigeria, failed due to defaulted insider loans made to 
politicians to whom credit had apparently been extended in exchange for arranging to 
have the funds of governmental or parastatal organizations deposited in the bank.311
Bank failure was not confined to Africa; for example, another six banks failed in Turkey 
at about the same time.
As mobile telephone service providers and other intermediaries enter the market 
for payment services, insolvency of payment service providers and money remitters has 
become a consumer issue in the developed world as well.  Numerous payment services 
have been dissolved or initiated bankruptcy cases in the United States, and the legal 
system has had to address issues regarding the entitlement of consumers and payees to 
funds deposited with the payment service.  If mobile telephone service providers become 
major providers of payment services, the same issues may have to be addressed with 
respect to telephone service providers that become insolvent.
One solution is to extend governmental deposit insurance programs to cover funds 
deposited to add value to prepaid cards.  For example, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation in the U.S. recently initiated a proposed rulemaking to extend deposit 
insurance to bank accounts established by employers to pay workers who are issued 
payroll cards linked to those accounts.312
VI. Conclusions
The lack of a global focus of scholarship in payment systems law has flawed that 
scholarship.  Americans’ use of payment cards has been treated as mainstream.  It is not.  
America’s addiction to credit cards is an anomaly – perhaps one that is gradually 
disappearing, but an anomaly nonetheless.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this article:
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1. Debit and prepaid cards are proliferating in countries that lack an adequate
regulatory regime for protecting the consumers who use them.
2. The billions of people of low to moderate incomes who are being hurled from a 
cash economy into the era of electronic payments in emerging economies by the 
proliferation of debit and prepaid cards are particularly vulnerable to abuses by banks and
merchants.
3. Unregulated private lawmaking by payment card associations and card issuers 
will not ensure that consumers are treated fairly, due to their countervailing incentives to 
attract merchants into payment networks.
4. Technological solutions promote efficiency and limit abuse, but cannot ensure 
fair resolution of consumer disputes.
5. Nations with emerging economies should not uncritically emulate regimes of 
consumer protection adopted in the United States and Europe, which in many respects 
lack a consistent conceptual foundation  and fail to address problems, such as bank fees, 
access to banking services and insolvency, that are poorly addressed in developed 
countries if they are addressed at all.
6. Debit and prepaid card transactions are both a convenient means of obtaining 
cash and a substitute for cash, but this does not justify treating consumers who use debit 
and prepaid cards as if they had paid in cash.  
7. The lack of anonymity inherent in the use of payment cards entails risk for 
consumer privacy, but also makes possible greater transparency and disclosure to 
consumers of outcomes of the chargeback system such as merchant ratings.
8. Fees and charges imposed on consumers for payment card services are one of 
the most prolific sources of consumer complaints.  Fee regulation should be regarded as a 
legitimate part of payments law in scholarship on the subject, and should not be ignored 
in establishing a regulatory system to govern debit and prepaid cards.
